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THE VERTICAL SEPARATION OF POWERS
VICTORIA NOURSEt

ABSTRACT

Standardunderstandingsof the separationof powers begin with
the concept of function. Professor Nourse argues thatfunction alone
cannot predict important changes in structuralincentives and thus
serves as a poor proxy for assessing real risks to governmentalstructure. To illustratethispoint, the Article returnsto proposals considered
at the ConstitutionalConventionand considersdifficultcontemporary
cases such as Morrison v. Olson, Clinton v. Jones, and the Supreme
Court's more recentfederalism decisions. In each instance,function
appears to steer us wrong because it fails to understandseparationof
powers questionsas ones of structuralincentiveand political relationship. In order to move away from function as the sole proxy for structuralrisk, the Articlesuggestsa "vertical"approachtowardseparation
of powers questions. That approach reconceivesdepartmentalpower
less as the power to perform a set of tasksfitting a particularconstitutional description(e.g., adjudication,execution,legislation) than as a
set of constitutionallycreatedpolitical relationshipsbetweenthepeople
and those who govern them.Put anotherway, the separationof powers
becomes less a search for transcendentaldescriptionsof the departments than a means of consideringhow shifting structureaffects liberty-how structuralincentivesmay incline governmentalactors to act
toward the people in ways that risk the electoralpowers of both majoritiesand minorities.

t VictoriaNourse, Associate Professorof Law, Universityof Wisconsin.Specialthanks
to Ann Althouse, Neil Komesar,and Jane Schacterfor readingearly draftsof this Article, as
well as to the membersof the ColumbiaLegal TheoryWorkshopand, in particular,to Michael
Dorf, George Fletcher,and Peter Straussfor listeningto the some of the ideas presentedin an
earlyversionof this Article.I would also like to thankthe studentsin ProfessorKomesar'sLaw
and Economicsseminar,who read and commentedon a later draft. The editors of the Duke
Law Journal,in particularScott Thompson,provided excellent assistance.All errors are, of
course,my own.

749

750

DUKE LAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 49:749

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction..........................................................................................
750
I. Testingthe FunctionalIdeal......................................
....754
A. A VerticalChallenge.....................................
757
B. A HypotheticalConstitution......................................... 760
C. PoliticalRelationships.........................................................761
....768
II. Bridgingthe Realism Gap ......................................
A. Can a Man "Happen"to Be President?......................768
B. Morrisonv. Olson:Will Congress'sRole Please Step
772
Forward?.................................................................
C. The FederalismCases:At the Intersectionof
Horizontaland VerticalSeparation.................... 777
III. ConsideringPoliticalRelationships........................................781
A. Structureand ConstituentHarms...................................781
B. ShiftingConstituencies:The ComparativeNatureof
VerticalAnalysis..................................784
C. The Silent Demands of the FunctionalIdeal....................788
D. The Counterarguments.................................................795
IV. The Idea of Power and the Courts'Role in Separationof
799
Powers Cases.....................................................................
INTRODUCTION

Tell a lawyer to take out a pen and paper and to write down the
power the Constitutionprovides to the Congress,the President,and
the courts. No doubt she will provide you with something that looks
vaguely like the Vesting Clauses'or a list of governmentalfunctions,
emphasizingthe executive, legislative,and judicial.What you will not
have is a workinggovernment--or at least, there will be no one running it, no one voting for it, and no one representinganyone else. You
may excise the words "executive,""legislative,"and "judicial"from
the Vesting Clauses,replace them with other adjectives,or strike the
Vesting Clauses altogether.2 People will still vote,3 Congresswill still
art. I, ? 1 ("All legislativePowersherein grantedshall be vested in a
1. See U.S. CONST.
Congressof the United States...."); id. art. II, ? 1, cl. 1 ("TheexecutivePowershall be vested
in a Presidentof the United States of America.");id. art. III, ? 1 ("ThejudicialPower of the
United States,shallbe vestedin one supremeCourt,and in suchinferiorCourtsas the Congress
may fromtime to time ordainand establish.").
2. By "VestingClauses,"I mean the specificlanguagein the first sentencesof the provisions of Article I, Section1; Article II, Section 1; and Article III, Section1 of the Constitution.
See supranote 1 (quotingthe relevantlanguage).
3. The VestingClausesdo not createthe electoralrelationshipscontemplatedby the Con-
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convene,4the SupremeCourtwill still decide cases,5and the President
will still direct his administration.6The Constitution describes our
government as a compendium of executive, legislative, and judicial
powers,7but it also createsthat governmentby constitutingelectoral
relationshipsthat confer politicalauthority.8
If this is right,then it is time to reconsidera basic assumptionrelied upon by scholars,courts, and lawyers in analyzingseparationof
powers controversies.It is a commonplace of structuraltheory that
we have three branches of government arrangedhorizontally along
"functional"9
lines, separatingjudicialfrom executive from legislative
In
this
Article, I urge that this image of horizontalseparation
power.
is incompleteif it does not take into accountthe "vertical"10
aspects of
stitution. See U.S. CONST.art. I, ?? 2-3 (establishingthe process by which members of the
House of Representativesand the Senate are elected);id. art.II, ? 1, cls. 2-3 & amend.XII (creating the process by which Presidentsare elected); id. amend.XVII (providingfor the direct
election of Senators).
4. Outside the Vesting Clauses,the Constitutionspecifies that "[t]he Congressshall assembleat least once in everyYear."Id. art.I, ? 4, cl. 2.
5. Article III, Section 1 of the Constitutionprovides for the appointmentof Supreme
Court"judges"and their paymentand tenure in a sentence separatefrom the Vesting Clause.
Even if one were to strike the first sentence of Article I "vesting"judicial power, section 2
wouldstill providefor the "JudicialPower"and specifythatit "extend[s]to all cases in Law and
Equity. . . ." Id. art.III, ? 2.
6. See U.S. CONST.art. II, ? 1, cls. 2-3 & amend. XII (providingfor the election of the
President);id. art. II, ? 2, cl. 2 (authorizingthe President'sappointmentof executive officers);
id. art. II, ? 3 (establishingthe President'sduty to faithfullyexecute the laws).
7. See supra note 1 (referringto the Vesting Clausesand the "legislative,""executive,"
and "judicial"powersof the federalgovernment).
art.I, ? 2 (providingfor the electionof membersof the House of Rep8. See U.S. CONST.
resentatives);id. art.I, ? 3, cl. 1 & amend.XVII (establishinga processfor the electionof members of the Senate);id. art.II, ? 1, cls. 2-3 (creatingproceduresfor the electionof the President);
id. art. II, ? 2, cl. 2 (grantingthe Presidentthe power to nominate Justices to the Supreme

Court).
9. I use the term "functional"throughoutthis Article to refer to the use of "function"to
describe our three principalgovernmentalbodies. It is not intended to refer to the school of
thoughtknownas functionalism.When I use the term "functional,"it can describeeither a formalistor a functionalistapproach.See infranote 27. When, however,I use the terms"functionalist"or "functionalism,"
I am referringto a particularschoolof thought.Let me also emphasize
that I am not sayingthat the descriptivetermsin the VestingClausesare constitutionallyirrelevant;they may be quite relevantin determiningthe limitson an individualinstitution'spower.
The question remainswhether they are particularlyhelpful in assessingseparationof powers
questions.
10. I borrowthis termfrom JusticeKennedy'srecentconcurringopinionin Clintonv. City
of New York,524 U.S. 417, 452 (1998) (Kennedy,J., concurring)(statingthat the "[s]eparation
of powersoperateson a verticalaxis as well, between each branchand the citizensin whose interest powersmustbe exercised"),althoughthe notion thatverticalrelationshipis importantto
political structure is quite old. See, e.g., HANNAHARENDT,ON VIOLENCE44 (1970) (discussing
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political power, aspects that are intimatelyconnected with notions of
constitutional risk and institutional incentive. By vertical power, I
mean those relationshipsbetween governmentand constituencythat
create and, in this sense, constitutethe three differentbranchesof our
government."The power created by our Constitution comes from
more than constitutionaldescription;it comes from the people, aggregatedin differentkinds of constituencies,commonlydistinguished
as districts,states, and nation. Thus, every shift in governmentalfunction or task can be reconceived,not simply as a shift in tasks but also
as a shift in the relative power of popular constituencies.For example, ratherthan askingwhether a shift in power is really executive or
legislative, we might ask from which constituencythe power comes,
and to which constituencyit is given, and what relative risks and incentives that shift entails for those constituencies.The risk on which
we would focus would not be the fuzzinessof a functionallabel, but,
instead, the risk that a shift in power would create substantialincentives for governmentactors to silence a majorityor to oppress a minority. There may be no easy answershere; indeed, the calculusmay
be quite complex, but at the same time it may representan "angle of
vision"12
that is distinctlymore realisticthan much legal discussionon
structuralmatters.Indeed, I believe that a verticalapproachmay lead
us toward a functionalismthat frees us from the standard battles
about whether we really can define the legislative, the judicial, and
the executive.

poweras politicalrelationship-"beingempoweredby a certainnumberof people to act in their
name"-in light of Madison's claim that power is public opinion); JEANHAMPTON,POLITICAL

105 (1997) (discussingthe historicalpedigreeof the conceptthat the people grant
PHILOSOPHY
politicalauthorityto their government);see also VictoriaNourse, Towarda "DueFoundation"
for the Separationof Powers:The FederalistPapersas PoliticalNarrative,74 TEX.L. REV.447
(1996) (discussingthe appearanceof this idea in TheFederalistPapers).
11. A "constituencyrelationship"is one likely to create incentivesto act in accordance
with the power to elect, appoint,direct,or remove.By constituencyrelationships,I mean both
directand indirectrelationships.Indeed,the absenceof suchrelationshipsmay form an important part of the incentivepicture.Thus,for example,that the SupremeCourthas no directrelationshipto any electoralconstituencymeans that it has differentincentivesthan does the Congress, which has direct electoral relationships.All judgmentsabout constituencyrelationships
offeredin this Article are comparativejudgmentsabout likely incentives.I make no claim that
any of these relationships"work"in some abstractsense. Thus,even if one cannotsay that the
House of Representativesdoes a good job of representation,one can say that its electoralrelationships are more local than those of the President. See BRUCEACKERMAN,WE THEPEOPLE:
69 (1991).
FOUNDATIONS
12.

JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW AND CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM 5 (1956).
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In Part I, I argue that the idea of function cannot predict important shifts in constitutionalstructure:I examine changes in structure
that do not shift function but, nevertheless, clearly shift political
power and important structuralincentives. I argue that these shifts
can best be explainedin terms of verticalseparation-that power may
shift even when function has not because a shift in political relationship creates new structuralincentives.In Part II, I urge that the vertical separation of powers may help us understandthe "realismgap"
between the nation'spoliticallife and the SupremeCourt'srecent and
most controversialseparationof powers cases: Clintonv. Jones13and
Morrisonv. Olson.14I also address the impact of this analysison the
Court's even more recent federalism cases, arguing that federalism
and separation of powers concerns intersect. In Part III, I flesh out
the implicationsof this theory, includingthe concept of shiftingstructural risk upon which the theory depends. When political relationships change, politicalincentiveschange.When one political audience
is replaced by another, political actors have new incentives to act in
accordancewith the interestsof those who now grant or control their
power. With those new incentives comes the possibility that some
constituencies will gain at the expense of others. Put another way,
shifting structuralincentives creates risks that our form of government may change because governmentdecisionmakershave new incentives to silence or privilege some constituencies, preferring the
many at the expense of the few or the few at the expense of the
many."In Part IV, I conclude by suggestingthat, in failing to account
for the vertical aspects of constitutionalstructure,lawyers have applied a view of political power that is an ideal of legal power. This
yields a law of constitutionalstructurethat is persistentlyrepetitive,
that is wooden, and ultimately,that challenges the "centralprinciple
13. 520 U.S. 681 (1997).
14. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
15. Althoughthis focuson incentiveandpoliticalrelationshipis not commonamongscholars, it is far from unknownto economistsand othersknowledgeableabout institutionsand economic theory.My notion of constitutionalrisk is based on modern-dayinstitutionalchoice theory, which emphasizes a participation-centered,two-force model of politics based on
ch.
ALTERNATIVES
majoritarian and minoritarian risk. See, e.g., NEILK. KOMESAR,IMPERFECT

3 (1994);see also infratext accompanyingnotes 133-37(discussingthe conceptsof majoritarian
and minoritarianrisk).This focus on incentivesis also consistent,however, with more ancient
discourses.See Cass R. Sunstein,Bad Incentivesand Bad Institutions,86 GEO.L.J. 2267, 2279
(1998) [hereinafterSunstein,Bad Incentives]("One of the great achievementsof the Framersof
the AmericanConstitutionwas to link the analysisof institutionsto an understandingof incentives.").
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of our legal order, that law exists for the benefit of people and not
people for the benefit of law."16
I. TESTING THE FUNCTIONAL IDEAL

When lawyers and judges write about constitutionalstructure,
they typically reach out to the terms "executive," "judicial,"and
"legislative"and seek to define and describethem, and thus to cabin
them, as function.17Soon, decidingseparationof powers controversies
becomes a question of squeezing new proposals-the legislative
veto,18 the line-item veto,19 the Sentencing Commission20-into old
functional categories. Too often, however, the actual results disappoint. The SupremeCourtopenly quarrelsabout how to characterize
a particularinnovation, and when all the opinions are added up, we
find that differentmembers of the Court have describeda single activity as executive,judicial,and legislative.21Not surprisingly,scholars
wax cynical and temporize, resortingin the end to repeatingJustice
Jackson'squotation about how it is all a hopeless mess of canceling
quotations."Soon, students are left with the impressionthat one of
the most importantfeatures of constitutionallaw-the structureof
government-makes no sense and that all we can say in the end is
16.

HURST,supra note 12, at 5.

17.

functions.See,e.g., MartinH. Redish&
Often this is done in referenceto "traditional"

Elizabeth J. Cisar, "If Angels Were to Govern": The Need for Pragmatic Formalism in Separa-

tion of PowersTheory,41 DUKEL.J.449, 480 (1991) (arguingthat the judicialbranchshouldbe
confinedto areasof "the 'traditional'judicialfunction").At other times,however,courtsdefine
these termsin more generalways.See,e.g., Bowsherv. Synar,478 U.S. 714, 733 (1986)(defining
"execution"as "exercis[ing]judgmentconcerningfacts that affect"the law and "interpret[ing]
the provisions"of the law).
18. See INS v. Chadha,462 U.S. 919,959 (1983)(invalidatingthe legislativeveto).
19. See Clintonv. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 448 (1998) (determiningthat the Line
Item Veto Act's cancellationprovisionsandauthorizedproceduresviolatedthe Constitution).
20. See Mistrettav. United States,488 U.S. 361,412 (1989)(holdingthat the use of the SentencingCommissionto set guidelinesunderthe 1984 SentencingReformAct was not unconstitutional).
21. See, e.g., Chadha,462 U.S. at 952 (1983) (describingthe legislativeveto as a legislative
actionaffectingexecutiveaction);id. at 960 (Powell,J., concurring)(describingimplementation
of the veto as adjudicativeaction);id. at 1001 (White,J., dissenting)(describingthe veto as a
legislativeactionby an agency).
legislativeexercisecountermanding
22.

See, e.g., E. Donald Elliott, Why Our Separation of Powers Jurisprudence Is So Abys-

mal, 57 GEO.WASH.L. REV.506, 525 (1989) ("'A centuryand a half of partisandebate and
scholarlyspeculationyields no net resultbut only suppliesmore or less apt quotationsfromrespected sources on each side of any question. They largely cancel each other."' (quoting
YoungstownSheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,343 U.S. 579, 634-35 (1952) (Jackson,J., concurring))).
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that things are "a mess."23Yet, despite all the cynicism, when new
controversies arise, these same students are taught by courts and
scholars to return quite readily to the very intellectual process that
has been branded as corrupt-the hope that we may cabin power by
findinga unique departmentaldescription.24
Conventionalschools of thought about the separationof powers
have done little to challenge and much to entrench the technocratic
vision that comes with seeing the departments25
as function. So-called
formal approaches to the separation of powers, for example, insist
that it is possible to achieve departmentalseparationif we simplyhew
to a sufficiently rigid tripartite formula.26Functional unity, we are
told, will keep the departmentsseparate;as long as executive powers
23. DANIEL A. FARBER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALON CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW:
THIRD CENTURY1024 (1993) (admonishing students that
THEMESFOR THE CONSTITUTION'S

"[t]he SupremeCourt'streatmentof separationof powers issues... is... a 'mess"'and that
academictheorieshave flourishedbecausethe "Courtseems unsureof what to do ... ." (citing
StephenL. Carter,Comment,TheIndependentCounselMess,102 HARV.L. REV.105 (1988))).
24. Indeed, "function-talk"appearsin a variety of otherwisediverse scholarshipon the
separationof powers.See, e.g., Rebecca L. Brown,SeparatedPowersand OrderedLiberty,139
U. PA. L. REV.1513(1991) (arguingthat separationof powersdisputesinvolve importantquestions of individualrights);Abner S. Greene, Checksand Balances in an Era of Presidential
Lawmaking,61 U. CHI.L. REV.123 (1994) (emphasizingthe checks and balancesbetween the
Presidentand Congress);HaroldJ. Krent,Separatingthe Strandsin Separationof Powers Controversies,74 VA. L. REV.1253, 1256 (1988) (arguingthat "the Constitutioncircumscribesthe
power of the branchesby limitingthe ways each can act");Peter L. Strauss,Formaland Functional Approachesto Separation-of-Powers
Questions-A Foolish Inconsistency?,72 CORNELL
L. REV.488, 522 (1987) ("[C]ourtsshould view separation-of-powers
cases in terms of the impact of challengedarrangementson the balance of power among the three named heads of
Americangovernment");Paul R. Verkuil,Separationof Powers,TheRule of Law and the Idea
of Independence,30 WM.& MARYL. REV.301 passim (1989) (emphasizinga rule of law approachthatminimizesconflictsof interest).
25. My usage of the term "department"to denote the three main governmentalbodiesPresident,SupremeCourt,and Congress-might seem odd. Conventionalmodem usage speaks
of the courts, Congress,and the Presidentas "branches."As Madisonexplained,the Framers
often referred to the three main bodies as "departments."One of the departments,the
Congress,has two branches,namelythe House and the Senate.See THEFEDERALIST
NO. 51, at
323 (JamesMadison)(JacobE. Cooke ed., 1961).On the other hand,the term "department"is
typicallyviewed as associatedwith departmentswithin the executive. See LawrenceLessig &
Cass R. Sunstein,The Presidentand the Administration,94 COLUM.L. REV.1 passim (1994)
(explaining the origins of administrativedepartments).The Constitution itself uses such
terminology.See U.S. CONST.art. II, ? 2, cl. 2 (providingthat the power of appointmentof
inferiorofficers may be made by "the Heads of Departments").Because of my emphasison
constituency,I have chosen the nomenclaturethat leaves the term "branch"available to
distinguishthe Senateand the House fromthe entireCongress.
26. See Redish & Cisar,supranote 17, at 455 ("The key point, however,is that no matter
how the termsare ultimatelydefined,the exerciseof each branch'spoweris to be limitedto the
functionsdefinitionallybroughtwithinthose concepts.").
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reside in the executive department,judicial powers in the judiciary,
and legislative powers in the Congress,we will be safe. The formalists' liberal antagonists,the so-called functionalists,seem at times to
accept this underlying notion of functional separation, urging only
that the descriptionsbe broadened or that the overlap not be "too
and choosing
Although borrowingthe vocabularyof realism28
great."'27
to embrace a balance of power,29many functionalistapproaches,like
formalones, retain explicit attachmentto the concept of function.For
example, when the Supreme Court uses a functionalistapproach,it
asks whether the challengedpractice underminesan existing departmental function, an inquiry that frequently leads the Court to ask
what functionthe challengedpracticeperforms."
Much of the commentary on the separation of powers makes
similarassumptions.Legal scholarswho believe that we should aspire
to a more rigid set of departmentalboundaries,3'as well as those who
would loosen them,32begin with function.33
So, too, do those who be27. For a succinctand carefuldescriptionof formalismand functionalism,see KathleenM.
Sullivan,Comment,Dueling Sovereignties:U.S. Term Limits,Inc. v. Thornton,109 HARV.L.
REV.78, 92-95 (1995). On the relationshipbetween formalismand functionalism,see Brown,
supra note 24, at 1530 (arguingthat the debate surroundingboth models "hangsin midair,
mooredto no granderobjective");Strauss,supranote 24, at 488-94(rejectingformalismin favor
of functionalismfor the administrativelevels of government);Mark Tushnet, The Sentencing
Commissionand ConstitutionalTheory:Bowls and Plateausin Separationof Powers Theory,66
S. CAL.L. REV.581,596 (1992)(arguingthatformalandfunctionalapproaches"converge").
is appealing.., .because it resonates
28. See Tushnet,supranote 27, at 603 ("Functionalism
with a hard-nosedrealism ."). Functionalargumenthas a long and venerablehistoryin real... S. Cohen, TheProblemsof a FunctionalJurisprudence,1 MOD.
ist thought.See generallyFelix
L. REV.5 passim (1937) (surveyingthe role of functionalismin legal science as a means of addressingpreviouslyignoredlegal questions).
29. See MartinS. Flaherty,The MostDangerousBranch,105 YALEL.J. 1725, 1732 (1996)
(emphasizingbalance-of-poweranalysisas the hallmarkof the functionalapproach).
30. See, e.g., Morrisonv. Olson,487 U.S. 654, 685 (1988)(inquiringwhethera "goodfaith"
interferedwith the executive function).It also requiresa
removal provision"impermissibly"
comparisonof the "function"of the challengedpracticewith the "function"of a department.
See Nixon v. Administratorof Gen. Servs.,433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977)("[I]indeterminingwhether
the Act disruptsthe properbalance between the coordinatebranches,the properinquiryfocuses on the extent to whichit preventsthe ExecutiveBranchfrom accomplishingits constitutionallyassignedfunctions.").
31. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi& KevinH. Rhodes, TheStructuralConstitution:Unitary
Executive,PluralJudiciary,105 HARV.L. REV. 1153, 1159 (1992) (arguingthat the Vesting
Clausesof ArticlesII and III stronglysupporta unitaryexecutivetheory);Carter,supranote 23,
at 138-39 (criticizingthe independentcounsel ("IC")statute as an illegitimatebreach of the
separationof powers doctrine);Redish & Cisar,supranote 17, at 455 ("[T]heexerciseof each
branch'spoweris to be limitedto the functionsdefinitionallybroughtwithinthose concepts.").
32. See, e.g., Elliott,supranote 22, at 509 ("[L]iteralismis stiflingseparationof powersjurisprudence... .");Paul Gewirtz,Realismin Separationof Powers Thinking,30 WM.& MARY
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lieve that separationof powers disputesare nonjusticiableor incoherent." Unfortunately,almost everyone ends with function,too; for it is
also widely believed that the Constitutionitself defies the dream of
functionalseparation35and that the SupremeCourt has demonstrated
its inabilityto delineate clear functionallines.36
A. A VerticalChallenge
If the only problem were one of fuzzy boundaries or uncertain
norms, there might be no reason to reconsiderold assumptionsabout
the separationof powers. But recent events have suggested that there
is a wide gap between what is perceived as a serious shift in power
and the law of separate constitutionalpowers. Many believe that the
Supreme Court failed to appreciatethe dangers of the independent
counsel ("IC")law or the implicationsof judicial supervisionof a sitting President.Although this may make the task salient, I confess at
the start that the source of my concern does not lie in currentevents
L. REV.343, 343 (1989) ("[R]igidcategoriesof branchpower simplisticallydisregardthe real
complexitiesof governmentstructureas we knowit ... .").
33. Indeed,even those who begin with historybeginwith function.See GERHARD
CASPER,
1 (1997) ("Theseparationof governmentalpowers along functionallines
SEPARATING
POWER
has been a core concept of Americanconstitutionalismever since the Revolution.");Flaherty,
supra note 29, at 1730-31(emphasizingthe importanceof a historicalunderstandingthat assumes the validity of the functionalideal). But see ChristineA. Desan, The Constitutional
Commitmentto LegislativeAdjudicationin the EarlyAmericanTradition,111 HARV.L. REV.
1381,1385(1998) (questioningthe projectionof modernconceptsof judicialfunctiononto early
Americanpractice).
34.

See, e.g., JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIALREVIEW AND THE NATIONALPOLITICAL

263 (1980) (arguingthat separationof powerscontroversiesbetween the Congressand
PROCESS
the Presidentare nonjusticiablepoliticalquestions);Tushnet,supranote 27, at 584-85(arguing
that the traditionalways in whichscholarsand courtslook at separationof powerstend to converge).
35. For example,the Constitutiondoes not grantto the Presidentpowers that are solely
executive in nature.See, e.g., U.S. CONST.art. I, ? 7, cl. 2 (grantingthe Presidentpower to return, and thus to reject,the policy pronouncementsof Congressand placingthis power within
Article I, not Article II). Similarly,the Congressis not grantedpowersthat are exclusivelylegislative in nature.See, e.g., id. art. I, ? 3, cl. 6 (grantingthe Senate the power to try impeachments); id. art. II, ? 2, cl. 2 (grantingthe Senate the power to consent to executive appointments).
36. JusticeStevenshas openly acknowledgedthat "governmentalpower cannot alwaysbe
readily characterizedwith only one of... three labels."Bowsher v. Synar,478 U.S. 714, 749
(1986) (Stevens,J., concurringin the judgment);see also id. at 750 (noting that "[t]he powers
delegated to the ComptrollerGeneralby ? 251 of the Act... have a ... chameleon-likequality");id. at 751 ("Underthe DistrictCourt'sanalysis,and the analysisadoptedby the majority
today, it would therefore appearthat the function at issue is 'executive'if performedby the
ComptrollerGeneralbut 'legislative'if performedby the Congress.").
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but in my readingof historyand my understandingof politicalpower.
I believe that it is fairly easy to see that the Framershad a far more
sophisticated and realistic sense of the dangers of shifting political
power than most lawyershave today. Although recent events may jar
those with conventionalideas to reconsidertheir position, we might
have known this all along.
The resistancelies, I believe, in the seeming incontestabilityof a
very basic concept-that the object of a law of separate powers is to
torture the departmentsinto legal descriptionsof what is legislative,
executive, and judicial.I think that this descriptiveproject has failed,
and obviouslyso; it is an open secret that the departmentsall perform
the functions of other departments,yet the Court, scholars,and students continue to talk as if they could make the descriptionswork.
My own belief is that the Constitutionconstitutesthe departmentsas
much as it describesthem, creates politicalrelationshipsas much as it
confines them.37 The key to maintaininga healthy separationof powers as a particularform of republicangovernment is attention not
only to the descriptivebut also to the constitutiveaspects of political
power. WillardHurstsaid it long ago: law is not only a tool of control,
but also a means of releasingenergy.38Our Constitutionis a means of
both limiting and creating political power. Any complete understanding of shifting power must grapple with the political incentives
that constitutivepower creates.
The premise of the verticalapproachis simple:if, as the constitutional text makes quite clear, the departmentsare created by various
political relationships-by voting, by representation, by appointment-then we must pay attention to those relationshipsin considering shifts in power. In one sense, this is obvious: shifting the war
power to the Supreme Court shifts political relationshipsas well as
tasks; it significantlyweakens the people's power to decide whether
to go to war. This reflects an equally obvious but broader principle
that changing the nature of the constituencies that control government can change the form of that government.Put decisionmaking
power in the hands of the few, and you lurch toward aristocracy;put
it in the hands of the many, and you invite the mob; take away the
37. This is not a new insight. See CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTUREAND
LAW(1969).
IN CONSTITUTIONAL
RELATIONSHIP

38. See HURST,supranote 12, at 7 (arguingthat the properunderstandingof 19th-century
law was not "thejealouslimitationof the power of the state, but the release of individualcreative energy").
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representativerelationshipaltogether,and you risk anarchyor autocracy.The verticalapproachasks whether and how the shiftingof tasks
among government players affects "who" will decide, where the
"who" appears as the constituencies creating the departments,and
where the risks are not descriptive impurities,but structuralincentives likely to change political relationships between the governed
and their governors.
Verticality seeks to identify constitutional harm in something
more than the transcendental-more than "too much" power, "balance" disrupted,or "functionsmixed." The vertical approachposits
that the constitutionaldanger in shifting functions lies in popular silences and amplifications,in empowering some constituenciesat the
expense of others. Under this view, the problemwith sending the war
decision to the Court is not the bad descriptivefit between war and
judicialfunction but the silencingof national and local constituencies
on such an importantissue-that the Courtwill go to war without the
people. As the Founders might have said, the fear is that, if we give
the war power to the Court,we will have tradedthe people's decision
for one by an elite, that we will have exchanged democracyfor aristocracy.
Rather than looking for a descriptionto impose from the "topdown," the vertical approach considers power from the "bottomup"-as a function of the people who grant it to the governmentand thus is an explicitly populist approach. It takes seriously, as a
matter of constitutionallaw and theory, what Hannah Arendt made
clear so long ago-that "when we say of somebody that he is 'in
power' we actuallyrefer to his being empoweredby a certainnumber
of people to act in their name."39With this shift from the categorical
to the relational idea of political power,4 the question is not what
power has changed hands, where the power belongs, or whetherthe
power shifted is too much, but who will wield that authorityand what
comparativerisksthat shift in decisionmakerentails for constitutional
relationshipsbetween the people and their government.
The vertical approach,then, locates constitutionalrisk, quite literally, in constituent harm-in the relationship between changing
constituencies and forms of government. The Framers knew that a
republicdepends for its form upon the ways in which it "mixes"coun39.

ARENDT,supra note 10, at 44.

40. See infraPart IV (discussingthis as a shift froma lawyerlyideal of power as command
to a constitutionalideal of poweras constitutive).
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tervailingforms of representation.4'Indeed, the unique genius of the
constitutional plan was its ability to mediate self-interest through
three forms of popular sovereignty,governmentby three differently
aggregatedconstituencies:the states, the localities,and the nation.42It
is in changingthe relative strengthof these politicalrelationshipsthat
we shift power in the sense of changingthe form of our government.
It is this that the law of the separationof powers shouldilluminate.
B. A HypotheticalConstitution
Let us engage in an intellectualexperiment.To test the power of
the conventionalfunctionalapproach,let us imagine a differentconstitution. In what follows, I will use that hypotheticalconstitutionto
show how the functionalunderstandingof political power cannot describewhat we know to be majorchangesin constitutionalstructure.I
will also use it to show that shifts in power can often be better understood as shifts in political relationshipand incentive-that what we
mean when we say that power has changed hands is that the decisionmakerhas changed.
Our hypothetical constitution resembles our own in all apparently significantways. There are three major institutions:the judiciary, the executive, and the legislature.Each institutionis describedin
preciselythe same constitutionalterms.The Vesting Clausesare identical,43and the departments' enumerated powers" are largely the
41. For a discussionof mixed governmentand its influenceon the foundingand in The
Federalist Papers, see Nourse, supra note 10, at 455 & nn.34, 482.

42. See id. at 500-01.By suggestingthat local constituencieshad a role in the originalconstitutionalplan, I do not mean to implythat districtelectionsare constitutionallycompelledby
Article I. Althoughthe Constitutionitself is not particularlyclearon this questionand electoral
practicehas variedover time, see infranote 50, supportersof the Constitution,includingMadison, appearedto assumethat federalrepresentativeswouldbe elected by districtsand that this
was essential to ensure equality of representation. See THE FEDERALIST
NO. 57, at 389 (James

countieswhichelect her State
Madison)(JacobE. Cooke ed., 1961)("Someof [Pennsylvania's]
representatives,are almost as large as her districtswill be by whichher [Federal]Representatives will be elected. The city of Philadelphia... will thereforeform nearlytwo districtsfor the
8-14
DISTRICTING
choice of [Federal] Representatives."); ANDREWHACKER,CONGRESSIONAL

(1963) (arguingthat Madison'sattachmentto districtingwas animatedby a concernthat "the
people" be representedin the House ratherthan a "selectivegroup defined by propertyand
family connections"and that "the concern of Madison,King, and Pinckneythat districtsbe
equal in size was an institutionalstep in the directionof securingthis democraticprinciple").
For most purposes,House memberswill be relativelymore locallytied thanthe Presidentor the
SupremeCourt,howeverthey are elected.
43.

See supra note 1.

44. By "enumeratedpowers,"I mean powers the Constitutionspecificallydescribes as
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same. There are, however, three differences between this hypothetical constitution and the real one. First, our imaginary constitution
provides that the House of Representativesshall elect the members
of the Senate;second, it decrees that the Congress'ssay is final on all
legislation, omitting any approval or disapproval by the President;
and third, it states that the Congress is permitted to appoint important members of the executive branch.Lest this seem, at the outset,
like a farfetchedacademicenterprise,one has only to refer to the debates of the ConstitutionalConvention to see that this might very
well have been our Constitution.Similar proposals were considered
but rejectedin 1787.45
C. PoliticalRelationships
The first difference in my hypothetical constitution is explicitly
one of constituency:the House is to elect the Senate. Would that
change our constitutionalarrangementof powers? In one sense, the
answer seems obviously yes. And, yet, we cannot know this from a
claim that there is a change in function. Under my hypotheticalconstitution, the House and Senate retain the same function-they still
legislate. And, yet, it is fairly easy to see that this proposal would effect dramaticchangesin our government.To be blunt, we would have
one, not two, houses of Congress. Beholden to the House for their
powers.See U.S. CONST.art. I, ? 8, cls. 1-18 (beginningwith "[t]heCongressshall have Power
To ..." and listingthe specificpowersof Congress);id. art. II, ? 2, cls. 1-3 (statingthat "[t]he
Ptesidentshallbe Commanderin Chiefof the ArmyandNavy .... He shallhave Power,by and
with the Advice and Consent...." and listing other specific powers of the President);id. art.
III, ? 2, cl. 1 (declaringthat "[t]hejudicialPower shall extend to all Cases,in Law and Equity,
arisingunder this Constitution. . . ." and listing other specific powers of the judiciary).This
leaves out items typicallyassociatedwith some departments.For example, the Bicameralism
and PresentmentClause,whichgives the Presidentthe "power"to veto, is not includedin Article II's list of presidentialpowersbut appearsinsteadas a limitationon the Congress.See id. art.
I, ? 7, cl. 2 ("EveryBill... shall,before it becomes a Law,be presentedto the Presidentof the
United States; If he approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his Objections.... .").
45. The Virginiaplan, which in amended form became our Constitution,originallyprovided that "membersof the second branchof the National Legislatureought to be elected by
those of the first...." 1 THE RECORDSOF THE FEDERALCONVENTION
OF 1787, at 20 (Max
Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966) [hereinafter FARRAND'SRECORDS](recording the May 29, 1787,

resolutionsproposed by EdmundRandolphof Virginia).The New Jersey Plan, a competing
proposalsupportedby a minorityof States,providedthe Presidentwith no veto power.See id.
at 242-45.The VirginiaPlan proposed that the executive (which was thought by many to be
made up of multiplepersons) be appointedby the Congress.See id. at 20 ("Resd. that a National Executive be instituted;to be chosen by the NationalLegislaturefor the term of years
.....•1
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election, Senators would have little incentive to depart from the interests of House members.Their constituents,in effect, become those
of House members. As George Mason put it at the Constitutional
Convention when arguingagainstjust such a proposal:it "would be
highly improper to draw the Senate out of the first branch... [because] it would make the Members too dependent on the first
branch.""
If we know that this proposalwould effect major changes in the
relationshipbetween the House and Senate, we do not know it because of text or even because of function.The text has not changed:
the Vesting and BicameralismClauses remain the same.47Nor has
function changed: the Senate has not aggrandizeditself by seeking
executive or judicial functions. What has changed, however, are the
political relationshipsthat govern the Senate's incentives to act. The
Constitutionassumesthat elected officialswill speak, however imperfectly, to those who elect them. Under our hypotheticalconstitution,
however, Senatorswill no longer addresstheir speeches to the people
of their state as they do today, or even to their state legislaturesas
they once did, but instead will speak to the membersof the House of
Representatives.
With that change in constituency,we can predict a change in incentive, and from there a change in the relationship between the
House and the Senate. Since Senators are beholden to House members under our hypotheticalconstitution,Senatorswill tend to act as
House memberswish them to act.48Put anotherway, we can see that
this hypotheticalconstitutionwould push us toward a Congressthat
would look far more like a unicameral legislature. The important
46. Id. at 59;see also id. at 52 (statementof JamesWilson)(urgingthe Conventionto reject
of a proposalto have the House memberselect Senators,as this wouldmake the Senate too dependenton the House).
47. By "text",here I mean the text conventionallyassociatedwith the powersof Congress
and the relationshipof its branches.Undermy hypotheticalconstitution,as underour own, Arart.I, ? 1 ("Alllegislaticle I wouldstill vest legislativepowersin the Congress.See U.S. CONST.
tive Powershereingrantedshall be vested in a Congressof the United States,whichshall conid. art. I, ? 8 (enumeratinglegislativepowers).
sist of a Senateand House of Representatives.");
Moreover,the BicameralismClause,requiringthat a bill be passed by both houses before becominglaw wouldalso be identical.See id. art.I, ? 7, cl. 2.
48. Thatwe mightwish "independence"upon these Senatorsdoes not meanthat the structure in which they find themselvesis conduciveto that independence.In this sense, my hypothetical is a kind of worst-casescenario;I assume,as did the Framers,that in designingstructure,it is wise to assumethat governmentalplayerswill act as structuralincentivessuggest,even
No. 51, supra note
if we hope that they also act as conscience demands. See THE FEDERALIST

25, at 349.
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point to see here is that, by changing the Senate's constituency,we
may change no function, but we may risk significant change to our
form of government.We change the relation not only of the House to
the Senate but also of the Congressas a whole to the other departments. For few would doubt, and the Framerscertainly understood,
that a unicamerallegislatureposes a far more powerful challenge to
the judiciaryand the executive than does a bicameralone. Indeed, in
Madison's view, a bicamerallegislaturewas essential to maintaining
the separationof powers for preciselythese reasons.49
What startedout, then, as a change in verticalstructure-shifting
the political relationships providing for the election of Senatorsturns out to affect horizontal structure-the distribution of power
among the three departments. The idea that vertical political
relationshipsmay affect the separation of powers is hardly without
precedent,but, in a sense, it is so obvious as to be invisible.We know
that the Constitutionnot only describespower in functionalterms but
also creates democratic constituencies and other political
relationshipsof appointmentand removal. Lawyers learned in their
tenth-grade civics class that the states elect Senators, local districts
elect membersof the House of Representatives,soand the nation as a
whole elects the President."5
Of course, there are many complications
to this picture,52but the basic premise should suggest, at least, that
49. Because Madisonfeared an all-powerfullegislature,he thoughtit necessaryto break
the legislativepower in two in orderto matchmore equallythe less-powerfulexecutiveand the
courts.See id. at 350.
50. In fact, the practicefor electing House membershas varied over time. Until the 17th
Amendmentwas ratifiedin 1913, Senatorswere elected by state legislatures.During most of
this period, the House was elected primarilythroughdistricts,with the exception that, before
ISSACHAROFF
1842,as many as nine small states chose to hold at-largeelections.See SAMUEL
ETAL.,THELAWOFDEMOCRACY
771 (1998) (discussingthe ReapportionmentAct of 1842).
By 1842, Congresshad requiredthat all states vote by districtfor House seats. This statutory
restrictionlapsedfrom 1929to 1967,andyielded occasionalstate departuresfrom strictdistrict
voting,but the districtingrequirementwas reinstatedin 1967.See id. at 772.Today,the only exceptions to this are the inevitableones that arise in the few states that have a single congressional representative.See id. Althoughthis historyis complexand intriguing,it does not change
the risksof a schemein whichHouse memberselect all Senators(riskswell knownto the Framers) or the risksof a schemein whichall House membershave statewideconstituencies--apractice neverfollowedunderour Constitution.
51. See, e.g., U.S. CONST.
art. I, ? 2 (providingfor the election of membersof the House of
Representatives);id. art. I, ? 3, cl. 1 (providingfor the election of membersof the Senate);id.
art. II, ? 1, cls. 2-3 & amend.XII (providingfor the election of the President).The originalelectoral Constitutionhas been amendedin severalways,most notably,to changethe waysin which
Senatorsare elected. See id. amend.XVII (providingfor the directelectionof Senators).
52. The electoral college complicatesmattersfor the President,for example, and indeed
there may be scenarios,such as the one-congressional-district
state, in whicha small numberof
Senatorsand Representativesare representingthe same constituencies.See supranote 50 (dis-
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but the basic premise should suggest, at least, that significantacrossthe-boardchanges in these fundamentalelectoral relationshipscould
change politicalincentives and thus structure.Indeed, a focus on participation and incentive is the basic core of the approachtaken by
many economists and political scientists toward political power.53To
lawyers, however, this may come as something of a shock, for it invites them to question whether their way of understandingpowerpower as function or Vesting Clause description-may fail to predict
important shifts in governmentalstructure.Certainly,a theory that
failed to warn of significantdangers to bicameralismis not one that
would have been acceptable to those who relied upon it to help secure the separationof powers.54
Now, consider the second provisionof my hypotheticalconstitution: the proposal to eliminate the President'sveto." Of course, few
would embrace the constitutionalityof a move to eliminate the veto.
cussingthe districtingquestion).Nor may it have been the foundingvision. See ACKERMAN,
supranote 11, at 69. As Ackermannotes, however,the originalvisionhas changed:"Weexpect
Senatorsto take a broader,more nationalistic,perspectivethan the typical Representativealthougheach Senator'spartialityto his own statestillmakeshimseem relativelyprovincialcomparedto the plebiscitarianPresidentwho constantlyexplainsthat he is the only officialelected
by all Americans...." Id. For my purposes,these complicationsare largely without significance.Relatively,the constituenciesof the three departmentsas a whole remaingeographically
and otherwisedistinguishable.
53.

29 (1993) (equating arguments on the
PSYCHOLOGY
See, e.g., JONELSTER,POLITICAL

"incentiveeffects"of the constitutionalschemewith publicchoice theoryand the politicaltheINSTITUTIONS
8, 15 (Kenneth A.
ory of the Framers); POSITIVETHEORIESOFCONGRESSIONAL

Shepsle& BarryR. Weingasteds., 1995)(describinghow a secondgenerationof positivepolitical theoristshave "suggestedwaysin whichinstitutionalstructurechannel[s]expressionsof legislative self-interest"and how variouskindsof organizationalchoice establish"institutionalincentives"to avoid problemssuchas lack of information);Neil K. Komesar,Job for Judges:The
Judiciary and the Constitution in a Massive and Complex Society, 86 MICH.L. REV. 657, 672-74

(1988) [hereinafterKomesar,Jobfor Judges](relyingupon the incentivesof membersof majorities or minoritiesto evaluate likely outcomes and appropriateinstitutionalchoices);see also
Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law & Economics, 50 STAN.L. REV. 1471, 1487

(1998) (equatinga focus on "incentiveeffects"withtraditionallaw andeconomicsscholarship).
54.

See THE FEDERALIST
NO. 51, supra note 25, at 350 (arguing that bicameralism is essen-

tial to maintainingthe independenceof the departments).
art. I, ? 7, cl. 2 ("EveryBill... shall,before it become a Law,be pre55. See U.S. CONST.
sented to the Presidentof the United States;If he approvehe shallsign it, but if not he shallreturn it, with his Objections. . . ."). As noted supranote 44, the so-calledveto power is not an
enumeratedpower of the Presidentunder Article II, but instead it appearsunder Article I,
whichgovernsthe passageof legislation.Otherwise,all enumeratedpowersof the presidencyin
Article II remainthe same in my hypotheticalconstitution,with the exceptionof the Appointart. II, ?? 2-3 ("ThePresidentshall be Commander
ment Clausepowers.See, e.g., U.S. CONST.
in Chief of the Army and Navy .... He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent .... [H]e shalltake Carethatthe Lawsbe faithfullyexecuted.... ").
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But note that there is nothing in currentfunctional approachesthat
would necessarily bar this proposal. Eliminating the veto does not
force Congressto adjudicateor the Presidentto legislate;both before
and after the proposal, the Presidentis still executing," the Congress
legislating,and the courtsadjudicating.
If function cannot give us a satisfactoryreason why the veto is
not mere surplusage,it is unlikely to give us a satisfactoryreason in
more difficultcases. The importantpoint to see here is that if function
does not warnus of a majorshift in power, the verticalapproachmay.
Withoutthe veto, not only is the Congressmore powerful,but its constituencies (local and state) become more powerful relative to the
President'snational constituency.Once we consider these vertical effects, we come to see quite easily what the Framersdid: that a constitution without a presidentialveto is a constitutionin which far more
power is granted to the states and localities. After all, the Antifederalists opposed the veto power because they wanted to protect the
not because the veto failed
power of state and local constituencies,57
to fit the properdescriptionof an "executive"function.
When our Constitutionprovides that the Presidentmay veto the
acts of the Congress,it permitsthe political departmentsto discipline
each other in a particularorder. The veto is not only a check by one
departmentof governmentagainstanotherbut also one of the important ways in which the Constitution gives primacy to national con56. Lest one thinkit impossibleto have a Presidentwithouta veto, it is worthnotingthat a
numberof state constitutions,draftedpriorto the ConstitutionalConvention,includedno veto
for the chief executive,see Flaherty,supra note 29, at 1761 & n.181, and that the New Jersey
plan, offered at the ConstitutionalConvention,includedprovisionsfor an executive with no
veto power, see 1 FARRAND'SRECORDS,supra note 45, at 244.

57. One of the Antifederalists'principalobjectionsto the Constitutionwas that it would
"destroy the states and produce a consolidation." GORDONS. WOOD, THE CREATIONOF THE
AMERICANREPUBLIC1776-1787, at 529 (1969); see also FEDERALISTS
AND ANTIFEDERALISTS

1 (John P. Kaminski& RichardLeffles eds., 1988) ("Antifederalistsarguedthat the Constitution would destroythe statesand create one large,consolidatedrepublicthat woulddeteriorate
into monarchyor despotism.").This reflected the Antifederalists'fundamentalfear that the
"verystructure"of the "newnationalgovernment"and its "detachmentfrom the people would
work to excludeany kind of actualand local interestrepresentation... ." WOOD,supra,at 516.
Antifederalists opposed the President's veto power, see JACKSONTURNER MAIN, THE

141 (1961)(notingthe Antifederalists'oppositionto the President'sveto), as
ANTIFEDERALISTS
they did manyother featuresof the Constitution,on the groundsthat it would increasethe possibility of consolidationand monarchyand thus decrease the power of direct representation.
See, e.g., The Address and Reasons of Dissent of the Minority of the Convention of Pennsylvania
to Their Constituents (Dec. 18, 1787), reprinted in THE ANTI-FEDERALIST
PAPERSAND THE
CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION
DEBATES247-48 (Ralph Ketcham ed., 1986) (explaining how

the veto increasedthe likelihoodof "unadequate[sic]andunsafe"representation).
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stituencies relative to those of states and localities (unless those localities muster significantevidence of nationalsentiment,a supermajority).8We are all familiarwith the concept of checks.What may not
be so obvious, however, is that these "discipliningrelationships"can
be conceived less as tools for departmentsto compete with each other
than as ways in which the Constitutionregulates political relationships: if the Congresswere to have power to veto the President,we
would not only shift power in a raw, undefinedsense, but, more specifically,we would give real primacyto those whom Congressrepresents.59And this occurs without regard to functionallabels: whether
we call the President's veto an exercise in legislative or executive
power, its real effect is to permitthe President'sconstituency(the nation) to veto the wishes of a majorityof the states and localities,thus
implementingand reinforcingthe SupremacyClause."
The vertical approach not only highlightsthe role of changing
political relationshipsand their effect on the form of government,it
can also help us to see connectionsbetween the separationof powers
and issues that have appearedsomewhat "technical"61-appointment
and removal powers. Consider our third hypothetical provision in
which the House and Senate would choose officersto sit in the executive department.From a functionalperspective,there may seem little
harm from this arrangement.The appointmentprocess does not noticeablyinterfere with passinglegislation,executinglaws, or deciding
cases; both before and after the proposal,the Congresscontinues to
legislate, the President to execute, and the courts to adjudicate.(Indeed, since the Senate confirms appointees,62one might even argue
that the appointment"function"is not foreign to the Congress.)

58. Article I makes clear that the Presidentmay work his will on legislationunless the
art.I, ? 7, cl. 2.
See U.S. CONST.
Congresscan mustera supermajority.
59. To fend off the studentof federalismat the start,my claimis not that the nationallegislatureprotectsthe states,as is arguedin HerbertWechsler,ThePoliticalSafeguardsof Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54

COLUM.L. REV.543 (1954), only that the legislature'spolitical constituenciescreate greater
incentivesto cater to local intereststhandoes the President'snationalconstituency.Thatwould
be truewhetheror not the legislatureroutinelybetrayedthe statesas governmentalentities.
art.VI, cl. 2 ("ThisConstitution,and the Lawsof the United Stateswhich
60. U.S. CONST.
shallbe madein Pursuancethereof... shallbe the supremeLaw of the Land;and the Judgesin
every State shall be bound thereby,any Thingin the Constitutionor Laws of any State to the
Contrarynotwithstanding.").
61. Morrisonv. Olson,487 U.S. 654,703 (1988)(Scalia,J., dissenting).
62. See U.S. CONST.art. II, ? 2, cl. 2 (grantingthe Senate confirmationpower over the
President'snominations).
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If we know that this "appointment"proposal would change constitutionalstructure,it is not because we have consultedthe definition
of legislative, executive, or judicial power or even the Appointments
Clause.63We know that power has shifted because political relationships have changed. Simply imagine the Congress exercising power
over the salaryor the tenure of judges and one can see that questions
of "personnel"are no trivial matters-they may determine the relative independence of an entire department.6 Similarly,it should be
fairly easy to see that, should Congress gain control over individual
executive department employees, Congress's power would increase
relative to the President. What may be harder and yet more important to see is why this is-even if there is no impairmentof function.
Again, the vertical approach is helpful. If the President's men
turn out, in fact, to be Congress'smen, then there is a risk, quite literally, that the President's incentives and constituency have changed.
Consider,for example, a Clinton administrationstaffed by friends of
Trent Lott or Bob Dole or Newt Gingrich,the President's political
opponents. The President as agent of a national constituencymight
now worrythat his administrationreflects less the hopes and fears of
the nation than of Kansas,Georgia, and Mississippi.65
What is at stake
in matters of appointmentor removal is not simply a technical question or even a question about the relationshipof Congressand President but the relationship between state and federal constituencies.
Again, this was not lost on the Framers,66
many of whom recognized

63. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 140 (1976) (construingthe AppointmentsClause to
bar certaincongressionalinvolvementin appointmentsof those performingadministrativefunctions that could only be exercisedby "Officersof the United States"(quotingU.S. CONST.art.

II,?2,cl.2)).

64. See Nourse,supranote 10, at 471-77.

65. I do not meanto suggestthatthe Presidentdoesnot havean incentiveor interestin
do createsuchincentives.The questionis
pleasingthe states;the electoralcollegeprovisions
whetherthisproposal(whichinsertsintothe executivedepartment
thosewithan incentiveto
incenwould,as a relativematter,increasetheexecutive's
pleasecongressional
representatives)
tivesto caterto stateinterestsat theexpenseof thenationalinterest.
66.

By 1787,it was well knownthat the Congressand the Presidentcouldnot remainsepa-

rateinstitutions
if the Congresshadcontrolovermembersof the executivedepartment.
See,

e.g., Statementof James WilsonBefore the PennsylvaniaConvention(Dec. 11, 1787), in 2 THE
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 550, 567 (Merrill Jen-

sen ed., 1976)("Tohavethe executiveofficersdependentuponthe legislativewouldcertainly
be a violationof thatprinciple
so necessary
to preservethefreedomof republics,
thatthelegislativeandexecutivepowersshouldbe separateandindependent.").
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that if Congresshad complete control over membersof the executive
branch,the presidencywould "slideinto ... the Legislature."67
II. BRIDGING THE REALISM GAP

If the vertical approachhelps to give us a new perspective on
separationof powers controversies,it must help in a real constitution,
not simply a hypothetical one. Recent events have suggested that
there is a broad gap between the nation's political life and the Supreme Court'sanalysisof the risks of structuralchange. In this part, I
explain why I believe that the verticalapproachmay help us ask questions that bridge that "realism"gap in the separationof powers. To
flesh out an alternativevertical approach, I consider what it might
have told us about the SupremeCourt'sdecisionsin Clintonv. Jones68
and Morrisonv. Olson,69 as well as in the Court's recent federalism
cases. I leave to Part III full explicationof the approachin theory.
A.

Cana Man "Happen"to Be President?

Clintonv. Jones is known as a case about executive function and
Faced with the question whether the Presipresidential immunity.70
dent could be sued by a private party, Paula Jones, the Supreme
Court rejected the President'sargumentsthat the judicial consideration of this suit would violate the separation of powers, concluding
that the suit would in no way impair executive or judicial "functions."7' As the Court put it: "[t]he litigation of questions that relate
entirely to the unofficialconductof the individualwho happensto be
the Presidentposes no perceptiblerisk of misallocationof eitherjudicial power or executive power."72
67. As MadisonwarnedEdmundRandolphin a privateletterduringthe removaldebateof
1789,if the Senate were to be given controlover membersof the executive department,"the
Ex[ecutive]powerwould slide into one branchof the Legislature."LetterfromJamesMadison
to Edmund Randolph (June 17, 1789), in 12 THE PAPERSOFJAMESMADISON229, 230 (Charles

F. Hobson & RobertA. Rutlandeds., 1979).For a far more extendedargumentabout the importanceof appointmentand removalto maintainingconstitutionalstructure,see Nourse,supra
note 10, at 456-61,469,514-19.
68. 520 U.S. 681 (1997).
69. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
70. See, e.g., Neal KumarKatyal,Judgesas Advicegivers,50 STAN.L. REV.1709,1754-55
(1998) (criticizingthe Court'sopinion for its focus on the immunityissue to the exclusionof
structuralconsiderations).
71. SeeJones,520 U.S. at 702-06.
72. Id. at 701.
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Read today, with the knowledge that the Jones suit led to the
impeachment of a sitting President, it seems difficult to understand
the Supreme Court'sconfidence that "thereis no possibilitythat [its]
decision will" have a significant effect upon the presidency.73And,
yet, from a functional perspective, the Court's analysis seems perfectly plausible.This proposal, like the ones in our hypotheticalconstitution, does not require that the Presidentperform any new or incompatiblefunction;nor does it seem to requirethe courts to take on
executive responsibilities.Indeed, the Supreme Court seems quite
right to conclude that the President'sinconvenience was insufficient
to overcome the plaintiffs right to be heard. Balancing the "inconvenience" of a private suit against the "rule of law," the Court not
surprisinglydecidedthat the suit should go forward.74
The issue remains whether the functional inquiry identifies all
the constitutionalrisks at stake. No one was really claimingin Clinton
v. Jones that the President could not be sued, only that he could not
be sued while in office." That should have raised, for the Court, the
question of constituencyand politicalrelationship.For what is the difference between a Presidentafter his term and a Presidentduringhis
term but the interests of those who empower him? In a republic, a
President does not "happen[]"76(as the Court put it); he is elected,
and, as an elected official, he exercises the political authoritygranted
him by a national constituency.From the vertical perspective, then,
the question in Clintonis not simply about inconvenienceor even the
rule of law, but the risks to the people the President represents.Put
more colloquially, a civil lawsuit against a sitting President may be
problematicnot because the Presidentis in any sense above the law
(he is not), but because the courts,which are political outsidersin our
system,"are not above the people.78
73. Id. (emphasisadded).
74. See id. at 706-08.
75. Indeed,the SupremeCourtseemed to concede this at one point. See id. at 697 (noting
that the Presidentdid not argue that he was completely immune from judicial scrutinybut
ratherthat he waspermitteda postponementof any suchproceedings).
76. Id. at 701.
77. By brandingcourtsas relativeoutsidersto the politicalprocess,I do not mean to suggest that courtsare completelyunrepresentativeinstitutions.On the representativeelements of
courts, see ChristopherJ. Peters, Adjudicationas Representation,97 COLUM.L. REV. 312
(1997). As a relativematter,however,it seems uncontroversialto conclude that courts do not
speak directlyto a particulargeographicconstituency,as does Congressor the President.I emphasize here and elsewhere that this analysisfocuses on relativeshifts in power, not absolute
ones. See infraPartIII.
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To see the risks, it is importantto remember that a President
sued is a Presidentwho may lose a suit and that a Presidentwho may
lose a suit is a Presidentwho will do politicalbattle over that loss. No
matterhow trivialor privatethe suit may seem-from a bad debt to a
slip-and-fall-if the Presidentis adjudgedto be negligent or to defalcate, his loss will not simplybe the loss of a privatecitizen but the loss
of a President,a player in that institutionalcompetitionwe know as
the separationof powers. It is not too difficultto predicthow a presidential loss in a suit about drunkdrivingor bad debts might create an
incentive for the President'spolitical opponents to step up their attacks or even lead to impeachment.9What may be more difficultto
see is how a judicialrulingchanges the President'sfate in that political battle. It is the judicial proceedingthat transformspublic denials
into claims of perjury,that transformsa privatematter of a debt or a
slip-and-fallinto a violation of the "rule of law." With or without a
judicialruling,the facts that led to the Jones suit mightwell have been
the subjectof an impeachmentproceeding.With a court ruling,however, the case for impeachmentchanges:whether the court says it is
avoidingpolitics or not, its decisionputs the judicialimprimatur,institutional legitimacy,even the rule of law, on one side of the political
debate. And, with this, the court risks acquiringpower to determine
(even if in small part) the political fate of the nation and its President."
Traditionally,the separationof powers issue in Jones is seen as
one of executivepower, but, if this is right, the question turns out to
be less about the executive than about the judiciary.Indeed, it is a
question less about the relation of the President to the courts than
that of the Congressto the courts. The separationof powers risk is
that the court is (inadvertently,perhaps, or even against its wishes)
acquiringa political role in "checking"the President,a role typically
left to Congress.As a general rule, our constitutionalsystem leaves it
to the politicallyresponsivebranchesto do battle by means of over78. This is not to say, however,that we do not value or prizecourts'countermajoritarian
pedigree to the extent that it serves to restrictmajorities'tendencyto treadupon the rightsof
also poses risks,risksthat should
minorities.It is to say, however,that countermajoritarianism
be assessedopenlyratherthansimplydenied.
79. Although no one will actuallybelieve this, early draftsof this argumentwere written
before the recent presidentialimpeachment.Ten years in Washingtontaught me something
aboutpoliticalincentives.
80. Even if the riskof this mightnot be greatin some instances,the cost may be very high
to the Courtin the long run,particularlywherethe issue reallyis whetherto postponethe suit
ratherthanto dismissit.
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sight and impeachment.Shifting even a small part of that power to
the courts,relativepolitical outsiders,and awayfrom Congressand its
direct constituency relations,s'should represent a serious separation
of powers question. Why? Because it risks shifting a matter of great
publicimportto those least responsiveto the people.
There are, of course, importantcountervailinginterests at stake
in the Jones case-the interests of the plaintiff and private litigants
generally.Indeed, it is these interests that make many appeal reflexively to notions of the "ruleof law" and "individualrights."The vertical approachsuggests, however, that this kind of move may be a bit
too easy; indeed, that these very concernsmight be more likely to be
satisfied by postponing,rather than proceeding with, the lawsuit. As
we will see in some detail later,82shifts in constituencytypicallydo not
simplylead to one kind of risk. Shifts from a more to a less politically
tied body tend to increase minoritarianrisk-the risk that a minority
may silence a majority;at the same time, shifts from a less to a more
politicallytied body tend to increasemajoritarianrisk-that a majority will silence a minorityor individual.Jones raises not only the question whether the Court's ruling will place the unelected in charge of
the nation's political life (minoritarianrisk) but also whether it will
subject individuallitigantsto the vagariesof the nation's political life
(majoritarianrisk). Put another way, if one is really concerned about
Paula Jones's fate, one must worrythat, if the suit is to proceed while
the President is still in office, politics might inevitably affect the
judgmentin her case. There is alwaysthe risk that any judge empowered to rule against the nation's leading political figure will be influenced by majoritarianpolitics in making her ruling,83
whether it is in
81. One mightarguethatJones shiftsthe power to check the Presidentfrom the Congress
to individuallitigants.As in the case of shiftingsuch power to an elite court, this kind of shift
also poses a minoritarianrisk-that the litigants,like Paula Jones, will not reallyrepresentthe
nation'scollective interestany more than courtsare capableof doing. Indeed, this is precisely
the dangerof having"impeachment-by-litigation,"
ratherthanby Senate trialor new electionthe riskis that a singlecitizenwith a grievancemay come to have inordinatepowerover the fate
of the nation,powershe wouldnever have at the ballot box. On minoritarianrisk,see infratext
accompanyingnote 134.
82. See infra text accompanyingnotes 129-37 (discussingmajoritarianand minoritarian
risk).
83. I do not mean by this the standardrealistclaimof politicsinfluencinglaw. I mean that
no judge will be able to ignorethe fact that one of the litigantsbefore the court is the President
and might well react in ways that are unique to the position of a sittingPresident.The judge
might,for example,be influencedto rule againstthe plaintiffbecauseof concernsabouthow the
rulingwouldaffect the nation.He might,on the otherhand,defiantlyrule againstthe President
to insist on the "independence"of the judiciary,despitedoubtsabout the viabilityof the claim.
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rejectingsuch politics too strenuouslyor in coddlingit too nervously.
And if the judge rules for or againstthe Presidentor Jones because of
majoritarianconcerns, rather than the demands of the lawsuit, one
can hardlycall this "the rule of law."
B. Morrisonv. Olson:Will Congress'sRole Please StepForward?
If Jones presents us with ways in which to see the vertical approachin operation,it may also point towardnew ways of seeing old
separationof powers dilemmas.Morrisonv. Olson,' the IC case, presents difficultquestionsfor the Court'sfuture approachin separation
of powers cases (even though the IC statute has not been renewed).
To many, today, in light of concernsabout Kenneth Starr'sIC invesit seems difficultto accept the majority'sconclusionthat the
tigation,85
At the
statute8 did not "undulytrammel[]on executive authority."87
same time, althoughmany have come to newly admireJusticeScalia's
dissent in Morrison,8 few are willing to accept the implicationsof its
formalism89-thatindependentagenciesare unconstitutional.%
The vertical approachmay, however, provide some clues about
what went wrong in Morrison-how functionalismcould have turned
out to be so unrealisticdespite its contrarypretensions,9'and yet how
the dissent'sformalismfailed to cure this problem.Morrisonis tradiOnce the Presidenthas left office these riskswill tend to decreasepreciselybecausehis relationshipto the people has been severed.
84. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
85. The public'sonce-heldconfidencein the "whiteknight"of independencehas been replaced with a concern that the IC may become a rogue figure,vindictive,wasteful,and selfserving.This is especiallytroublingwhen individuallives and careers are at stake. See, e.g.,
Robert Dreyfuss,CollateralDamage:ThePersonalCostsof Starr'sInvestigation,NATION,
July
27, 1998,at 11;LawrenceM. O'Rourke,ManyLawmakersTargetingIndependentCounselLaw,
SACRAMENTO
BEE, Feb. 16, 1998, at A17.

86. 28 U.S.C.?? 591-99(1994).
87. Morrison,487 U.S. at 691;see also id. at 693 ("The final questionto be addressedis
whetherthe Act, taken as a whole, violatesthe principleof separationof powersby undulyinterferingwiththe role of the ExecutiveBranch.").
88. An "independent"counsel simplywill not do, urges JusticeScalia, for the President
musthave powerover all executivefunctions-there can be no "independent"officerwithinthe
executivedepartment.See id. at 705 (Scalia,J., dissenting).
89. Id. ("To repeat,Article II, ? 1, cl. 1 of the Constitutionprovides:'The executivePower
shallbe vested in a Presidentof the United States.'As I describedat the outset of this opinion,
this does not meansome of the executivepower,but all of the executivepower.").
90. This latterconcernabout the statusof independentagenciesmay well workto give life
to the separationof powersproblemsraisedin Morrison,whateverthe futurestatusof the IC
statute.
91. See supranote 28 (discussingthe relationshipof functionalismto realism).
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tionally perceived as a case about executive power and the constitutionality of independent executive agents." As I explain more fully
below, there were other importantissues left unaddressedin Morrison. From a verticalperspective,Morrisonraises questions about the
relationshipof the IC not only to the President but also to the Congress. Indeed, the vertical approachsuggests that both the majority
and dissent in Morrison may well have been trying to answer the
wrong question by focusing so heavily on questions of removal.93In
the end, the most serious issue Morrisonposes may not be about the
status of independent agencies or the unitary executive but about
whether the statute permitsCongressand the Presidentto sever from
the people, even in small part, their power to choose their own government.
Consider a statute in which Congress delegated part of its impeachment authorityto an independent agent. The problemwith this
proposal would not depend upon the independence of the agent
alone, but upon the fact that an agent, with no constituency,is deciding the ultimate constituencyissue in a republic-the political fate of
a sittingPresident.The committedfunctionalistwould no doubt argue
that a partialdelegation of the impeachmentpower does not interfere
with the functioning of the executive or the Congress. But such an
approachbetrays the oddity of the conventional functionalists'realism. Perhaps a partial delegation of a function seems to matter little
in the abstract,but, in real life, it may matter quite a good deal. Indeed, it is precisely because it would matter to the people that many
would find it quite unconstitutionalfor Congressto hand over its impeachment authorityto an independent entity; in such a world, "we
the people" do not decide who governs but, instead, "we the investigating authority"decides.The constitutionalrisk of elitismis obvious:
that a willful bureaucratwill investigate and promptthe removal of a
Presidentthat the nation does not reallywant removed.
92. See HaroldJ. Krent,Symposiumon Morrisonv. Olson:Addressingthe Constitutionality
of the IndependentCounselStatute-ExecutiveControlover CriminalLaw Enforcement:Some
Lessonsfrom History,38 AM. U. L. REV.275, 277-78 (1989) (critiquingthe SupremeCourt's
assumptionin Morrisonthat criminallaw enforcementis an inherently"executive"function);
see also Carter,supra note 23, at 106 (consideringwhether Morrisonserves to legitimate a
scheme of governmentthat includesindependentagencies).
93. For an argumentabout why "good faith"removalprovisionsmay not be a particular
concern,even if congressionalcontrolover appointmentand removalis an importantseparation
of powersissue,see Nourse,supranote 10, at 514-18.See also RichardH. Pildes& CassR. Sunstein, Reinventingthe RegulatoryState,62 U. CHI.L. REV.1, 29-30 (1995) (suggestingthat the
"goodfaith"removalquestionmightbe resolvedin some cases by statutoryconstruction).
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I am not arguingthat the IC statute should have been held unconstitutionalbecause the statute delegated Congress'spower to impeach the President.But I am arguingthat the IC is not a standard
"independentagent,"raisingonly questionsanalogousto those raised
by the status of the Federal Trade Commissionor the NuclearRegulatory Commission.The importantpoint here, lost in the Court'sfocus on executive power and removal, is the degree to which the IC
statute shifts constituencieson the question of executive misconduct
and impeachmentand, as a result, creates significantincentives for
majority will to be thwarted. Traditionally,Congress (and its state
and local audiences) is responsible for policing presidentialmisconduct; the Constitutionitself seals this by grantingthe impeachment
power to the House initially"and then to the Senate.95The statute not
only permits the IC to investigate and prosecute the President but
also requiresthe IC to inform the Congressof groundsfor impeachment.96As Julie O'Sullivan has noted, "[t]his mandatory impeachment referralprovisionarguablymakes impeachmentproceedingsfar
more likely to be initiated, and when initiated, far more threatening
to the administration,"because it may allow "an IC to control the
The IC stattiming, scope, and content of impeachmentinquiries."97
ute thus shifts at least some of the responsibilitiesordinarilycommitted to the Congressto an official who is not only independentof the
Presidentbut also independentof the Congress,and whose incentives
may dispose him toward,ratherthan against,impeachment.98
At the same time as the IC statute shifts power awayfrom Congress, it also shifts importantpowers to Congress.Traditionally,the
power to prosecute is remitted to the executive department,not to

art.I, ? 2, cl. 5.
94. See U.S. CONST.
95. See id. art.I, ? 3, cls. 6-7.
96. See 28 U.S.C. ??88
591, 594 (1994) (authorizingthe IC to institutecivil or criminalproceedingsagainstthe President);id. ? 595(c) ("An independentcounselshalladvisethe House of
Representativesof any substantialand credible informationwhich such independentcounsel
receives... thatmayconstitutegroundsfor an impeachment.").
andthe IndependentCounsel
97. Julie R. O'Sullivan,TheInteractionBetweenImpeachment
Statute,86 GEO.L.J.2193,2195(1998).
98. See Sunstein,Bad Incentives,supranote 15, at 2279. ProfessorSunsteinnotes the ways
in which the IC statute creates incentivestowardzealotry:"An independentcounsel who uncovers nothing is likely to look as if he has more or less wasted his time, or done nothing,
whereasan independentcounsel who bringsa prosecution,or severalprosecutions,is likely to
look, in at least some circles,like anotherArchibaldCox, a kind of hero of democraticideals."
Id.
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the Congress." However, under the IC statute, the decision to prosecute is granted,in part, to members of Congress.The statute specifically contemplates that "[t]he Committee on the Judiciaryof either
House of the Congress,or a majorityof majoritypartymembersor a
majorityof all non-majoritypartymembersof either such committee,
may request in writing that the Attorney General apply for the appointment of an independentcounsel."'"That applicationmust identify the persons and subject of the proposed investigation.The mere
power to identify misconduct and its targets surely increases Congress's power, and the power of particularmembers of Congress,to
target individualsrelativeto the powers Congresswould have without
the IC statute. Indeed, there is no greaterpower of a prosecutorthan
to decide the targetsof an investigationand potential prosecution.'"'
A functional approach might tell us that, since this exercise of
congressional authority does not undermine the prosecutorialfunction in general, it is permissible.A vertical approach,however, suggests that this should be constitutionallycontroversial.The Constitution grants no power to Congress to prosecute criminal behavior;
indeed the Constitutionbars bills of attainderexplicitly.102There is a
good reason for this bar: the incentives of congressionalleaders to
punish the politically unpopular or simply their political enemies.
Those very same risks inhere in the IC statute. By grantingmembers
of Congress the power to target individuals,and without substantial
room for the Attorney General to reject investigations,1'03
the IC statute clearly creates incentives to politicize the decision of whom to

99. Even if there is doubt about whetherprosecutionhas alwaysconstitutedan executive
function,see Krent,supranote 92, at 290, there is little doubtthat Congresshas no poweritself
to prosecuteand punishindividuals(outsideof removalfromoffice).
100. 28 U.S.C. ? 592(g)(1) (1994).
101. See, e.g., FrankRemington,TheDecision to Charge,the Decision to Convicton a Plea
IN
of Guilty,and the Impactof SentenceStructureon ProsecutorialPractices,in DISCRETION
CRIMINAL
73, 98 (Lloyd E. Ohlin & FrankJ. Remingtoneds., 1993) (assertingthat
JUSTICE

"thecharging
decisionis ... thesinglemostimportant
decisionmadeinanindividual
case").

102. See U.S. CONST.art. I, ? 9, cl. 3 ("No Bill of Attainderor ex post facto Law shall be
passed.");see also Cummingsv. Missouri,71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 323 (1866) (defininga bill of
attainderas a "legislativeact whichinflictspunishmentwithouta judicialtrial").
103. See 28 U.S.C. ? 592(b)(1) (providingthat the Attorney Generalmay only refuse to ap-

is warpointan IC if she finds"noreasonablegroundsto believethatfurtherinvestigation

ranted");see also JamesP. Fleissner,TheFutureof the IndependentCounselStatute:ConfrontL. REV.427,
ing the Dilemmaof Allocatingthe Power of ProsecutorialDiscretion,49 MERCER

434 (1998)(notingthatthe "triggering
mechanism"
for appointment
of an IC is a "verylow
threshold"
andthat"thestatute'sformulais a recipeforreferral").
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prosecute.'"And those incentives are likely to be greater than if the
decision rested in the hands of a career prosecutor.This is precisely
because the political incentives of members of Congress,with their
smallerand more local audiences,are likely to be strongerthan those
of a federalprosecutor,whose politicalincentivesare dispersedacross
a national constituency,a broad range of prosecutions,and are limited by scarceresources.In shiftinga decision from a relativelyless to
a more local political audience, the IC statute increases risks to minorities and individuals-risks that the decision to prosecutemay depend upon the political whimsnot only of Congress,but of a few minoritymembersof a congressionalcommittee.'o5
To summarize,the IC statute poses two distinctstructuralrisksseparate and apart from the traditional question the statute raises
about independentagents and the unitaryexecutive.'"Shiftinginfluence over the question of impeachmentfrom state and local constituencies to an actorwithout constituency(i.e., the IC) takes a very public, political act and hands it, in part, to an actor without public
constituency.The second risk in Morrisonraises a very different is-

104. It has not gone unnoticedthat the statuterisksunfairnessto individuals.See e.g., Morrisonv. Olson,487 U.S. 654,727 (1988)(Scalia,J., dissenting)(consideringthe effect of the statute upon the fairnessof the process).However,this is usuallyphrasedas a questionof equal
treatment,not a question about the role of Congressin the decision to prosecute.See, e.g.,
Fleissner,supranote 103, at 433 (arguingthat the statute "createsthe risk of subjectingthose
investigatedto a differentlevel of scrutinyand pursuitthan an ordinarycitizen might face").
Congresshas indeed attemptedto respondto the "unfairness"problemin directingIC investigationsto look more like DOJ investigations.It did not, however,give up its role in prompting
the investigations. See Julie O'Sullivan, The Independent Counsel Statute:Bad Law, Bad Policy,
33 AM. CRIM.L. REV. 463, 469-70 (1996).

105. For how an informationalcascademay generatesuch a call, even in cases supported
originallyby few membersof Congress,see Sunstein,Bad Incentives,supranote 15, at 2276-77.
106. In this regard,it is importantto rememberthat the IC is not a standardindependent
agent. Independentagents within the executive departmentmay be tied to the President
throughvariousmeans.The Presidentcan, as an organizationalmatter,subjectthem to some
policyand budgetcontrol;indeed,it is possiblethat independentagentsmayeven be firedif the
statutoryterm "neglectof duty""allow[s]some scope for construction."Pildes & Sunstein,supra note 93, at 28-31.None of these safeguardsappliesto the IC:the IC'sbudgetis not controllable by the President,see O'Sullivan,supranote 104, at 467; the Attorney General'ssupervisory authorityis limited,see Fleissner,supranote 103, at 434; and even the Attorney General
cannot,in the end, feel free to fire the IC, see 28 U.S.C. ? 596(a). It inevitablybringswith it the
specter of confession,as PresidentNixon's "SaturdayNight"massacreso clearly attests. See,
e.g., Frank Tuerkheimer, Watergate as History, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 1323 (reviewing STANLEYI.
THE LASTCRISISOF RICHARDNIXON(1990)); see also
KUTLER,THE WARS OFWATERGATE:

Sunstein,Bad Incentives,supranote 15, at 2274 ("An AttorneyGeneralwho dischargedan independentcounsel, or attemptedto control an independentcounsel's operations,would face
enormouspoliticalpressure,and any AttorneyGeneralwill knowthis.").
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sue-risk not to the public but to individuals.Shiftingpart of the decision to prosecute from the executive to the Congressincreases the
risks that individuals will be targeted for their politics, not their
crimes.Events have suggestedthat both of these risks were more real
than anticipatedeither by Morrison'sdissentingor majorityopinions.
C. TheFederalismCases:At the Intersectionof Horizontaland
VerticalSeparation
If the vertical approachmay help us to understandthe realism
that
has arisenbetween separationof powers doctrineand recent
gap
it
events, might also have predicted the growing controversy about
the Supreme Court's new federalism cases. Recently, the Supreme
Court has decided several contentious cases-among them United
States v. Lopez,17 Florida Prepaid PostsecondaryEducation Expense
Board v. College Savings Bank,'8 and City of Boerne v. Flores'"arisingunder doctrinesas variousas the CommerceClause,the Fourteenth Amendment, and sovereign immunity.In each of these cases,
the Court has emphasized federalism concerns but has been less at
pains to explain how the states' fundamentalinterests have been impaired than to outline how Congress has failed. In Lopez, the Court
found that Congress had made no record of a substantialeffect on
commerce;"oin Florida Prepaid, the Court concluded that Congress
had not amassed sufficient evidence of equal protection violations;"1
and in Boerne, the Court held that Congresscould not "enforce"the
Fourteenth Amendment if its proposed remedy would change the
"constitutionalright" at issue.112 Stripped of the complex doctrine
generated by these cases, the real issue each raises is as much about
federalism as it is about the relative strength of the Supreme Court
and the Congress.
107. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
108. 119 S. Ct. 2199 (1999).
109. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
110. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563 ("[T]othe extent that congressionalfindingswould enable
us to evaluatethe legislativejudgmentthat the activityin questionsubstantiallyaffectedinterstate commerce,even thoughno such substantialeffect was visible to the naked eye, they are
lackinghere.")(footnote omitted).
111. See FloridaPrepaid,119 S. Ct. at 2208 ("[T]helegislativerecordstill provideslittle support for the propositionthat Congresssoughtto remedya FourteenthAmendmentviolationin
enactingthe PatentRemedyAct.").
112. City of Boerne,521 U.S. at 519 ("Congressdoes not enforce a constitutionalright by
changingwhatthe rightis.").
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It is generally thought that the doctrines of federalism and the
separation of powers are quite distinct. But the vertical approach
predictsthat federalismand separationof powers concernsmay intersect. We saw earlier, for example, that were we to eliminate the
President's veto power, the resulting constitutionalstructurewould
not only decreasethe power of the Presidentrelative to the Congress
(a horizontalshift) but also increasethe power of state and local constituencies (a vertical shift)."3 Shifts at the horizontallevel may thus
affect shifts typicallyseen as vertical-the relative power of the state
and national governments.Indeed, this is well known, although not
often consideredin this way. It is often complained,for example,that,
if the Congressdid not delegate so frequentlyto the executive branch
our national governmentwould not be as powerful as it is relative to
the states. Perhaps more importantly,if this point were taken seriously, it should cause the SupremeCourt to take greater pains in its
separation of powers decisions to consider their federalismimplications, a step that so far has only been hinted at by Justice Kennedy,
from whom I have borrowed the term "vertical"separationof powers.114

If horizontal shifts may cause vertical power arrangementsto
change, the opposite may be true as well: federalism questions (or
shifts in vertical arrangements)may raise separationof powers concerns. The recent federalismcases make this quite clear."5In an earlier era, the SupremeCourt allowed Congressbroad leeway to make
113. See supratext accompanyingnotes 55-57.
114. See Clintonv. New York, 524 U.S. 417, 452 (1998) (Kennedy,J., concurring)(noting
that the "[s]eparationof powersoperateson a verticalaxisas well, betweeneach branchand the
citizensin whoseinterestpowersmustbe exercised").Kennedy'sargumentin the line-itemveto
case was that the veto gave the Presidenttoo muchpowerto "rewardone groupand punishanother,to help one set of taxpayersand hurtanother,to favorone State and ignoreanother."Id.
at 451.

115. In the Boerne decision, the Court specificallyraised this point, urgingthat Congress
had violated the separation of powers by exceeding its remedial powers under the 14th
Amendment.See Cityof Boerne,521 U.S. at 524,536. Undera verticalapproach,thisconclusion
of congressionalaggrandizementis not obvious:had Congresssought to "decide"Religion
Clausecases,we couldcertainlysay that it had takenpowerfromthe courts.This was not, however, what Congressdid underthe ReligiousFreedomRestorationAct; Congress'sbig mistake
here seems to have been its attemptto borrowlanguagefrom the SupremeCourt'sown opinions andput it into a statute(languagethat the Courtclearlyhad the rightto ignoreas a matter
of constitutionallaw withoutmaintainingthat this borrowingsomehowviolatedthe separation
of powers). See David Cole, The Value of Seeing Things Differently: Boerne v Flores and Congressional Enforcement of the Bill of Rights, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 31, 41 ("RFRA provided a

statutoryright,not a constitutionalright.It did not changethe Constitution,but only the United
StatesCode.").
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decisions about the relations between the states and the federal government under a variety of its powers. Now, the Court has significantly changedthat status quo by restrictingCongress'spowers to abrogate sovereign immunity, to legislate under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, and to exercise its Commerce Clause powers."6Even assumingthat each of these decisions has a defensible basis, the question would still remain whether the Court should also
considerthe horizontalrisks of these decisions.The verticalapproach
tells us that, in cases like Jones and Morrison,a shift to an unelected
decisionmakerfrom one with direct constituency creates risks that
political electorates will be silenced. So, too, may the federalism
cases.
When a task is shifted from Congress to the courts, there is a
shift from a national body with the relativelygreatestincentives to be
influenced by state and local political constituencies (i.e., Congress)
to a national body that has no constituencyand no such structuralincentive (i.e., the courts)."7 This creates risks that the voices of an aggregate of state and local constituencieswill be silenced and indeed
that an elite unelected body will act in their name. My point is not
simply about the countermajoritarianrisks of constitutional decisionmakingnor about the Wechslerianclaim that Congress protects
the states' interests."8Congressmay well forsake the states' interests,
and it may do so on a regularbasis. As a relative matter, however, it
seems difficultto claim that the Senatorfrom Illinois has fewer political ties to state officials and constituentsthan do the members of the
SupremeCourt."9This does not mean that the SupremeCourt cannot
decide federalismmatterswithout violating the separationof powers.
I think it can and should. My point is thatthefederalismcases are also
separationof powers cases. And, since they are separationof powers
116. See cases citedsupranotes 107-09.
117. In indicatingthat there is a separationof powersrisk,I am not assertingthat the court
is not permittedto take that riskor that the riskmay not be justifiedby otherprotectionsor interests. I am sayingthat the risks should be consideredin more than an offhandstatementof
deferenceto Congressor a confidentassertionof the Court'srightto assertwhat the Constitution says.
118.

See Wechsler, supra note 59, at 558.

119. LarryKramerseems to me to be absolutelycorrectwhen he arguesthat politicalparty
structureprovidesthe "glue"that often bindsfederal Senatorsand Representativesto state in-

terests. See Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1491 (1994) (re-

countinghow the constitutionalstructurehas evolved to "linkthe politicalfortunesof state and
federalofficeholders--creatinga mutualdependencethat obligespoliticiansat each level to pay
attentionto politiciansat the other").
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cases, the Court must take into account not only structuralconcerns
about the relationshipof the states to their citizensbut also the implications of its own decisions on the relationshipbetween the Court
and Congress.
There is no question that all the national departmentshave significant incentives to arrogate power to themselves and away from
the states. There is also no question that this can create risks to minorities and individuals.The problem is that this is not the only risk.
For if there is a risk to the liberty of individualsin failing to maintain
federalism,there is also a risk to majorities(even state and local majorities) from a Court that seeks to protect its own prerogativesat
Congress's expense. As Mark Tushnet has put it, "[i]f members of
Congress have an incentive to maximize the sphere of their power
and responsibilities,then so do Supreme Court justices with respect
to theirsphere."•20In cases in which Congressclearly has not considered the interestsof the states, there is every reason for the Court to
demand of Congress a deliberate effort to consider states' interests
and federalism risks. When, however, Congress has considered the
states' interests, and indeed when states support the national effort,
the question becomes whether the Court's federalism decisions risk
substitutingan abstractand elitist vision of state autonomyfor a real
one.
The verticalapproachpredictsthe ultimateirony here: the states
themselves may end up paying for this judicial federalism. Indeed,
there are risks that, when states impress themselves upon Congress
and are effective in making their concerns known, the Court will ignore them.'2'Time will tell whether the Supreme Court will address
these concerns in its next round of federalismcases, but at least one
currentlypending case raises the distinct possibility that federalism
will spell the demise of a statute that both Congressand a superma120. Mark Tushnet, Two Versions of Judicial Supremacy, 39 WM. & MARYL. REV. 945, 949

(1998);see also id. at 950 (notingthat "[t]hosewho assumethat the Courtwill act in good faith
to enforce the Constitutionseem, in this context,unwillingto assumethat Congresswill act in
interests
good faith").Tushnetalso points out that "[s]omehowCongress'spower-maximizing
are thought,not simplyto operate in conjunctionwith, but to displace,its good faith,"and he
concludesthat he "know[s]of no reasonto adopt that assumptionwith respectto Congressbut
not withrespectto the courts."Id.
121. My argumentis not that the statesmay,for the sake of politicalwhim,abrogateessential featuresof the relationshipbetween the state and its citizens.The questionalwayscomes
down to what federalismmust mean, a meaningthat I would arguemust be consideredin the
light of the politicalincentivesand risksinvolved,ratherthan some abstract"functional"distributionof powers.
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jority of states support as a proper exercise of cooperative federalism.122
III. CONSIDERING POLITICAL RELATIONSHIPS

Applying a theory does not explain how it works. In this part, I
explain why the separationof powers is, in the end, a question of who
will govern-where "who"refers to the people gathered in constitutionally created constituencies. The separation of powers is, in this
sense, not only a separationof constitutionalduties, powers, or functions, but also a separationof politicalrelationshipsbetween the government and the people. I first consider the reasons why a vertical
approachmight add greaterrealismto the analysisof structuralrisk. I
explain the comparativenature of the proposal (with its focus on risk
and structuralincentive), consider its advantages over the current
functionalideal, and respondto objectionsbased on text, history,and
pragmatism.
A. Structureand ConstituentHarms
Lawyersrevere the separationof powers as a constitutionalideal
without ever really identifyingthe dangersthat follow from structural
change.1'3Contemporarydoctrine too often suggests that separation
of powers violations produce a kind of transcendentalharm-causing
functions to be mixed, boundaries to be crossed, and balance to be
disrupted.'24Few can tell you, for example, why any of these harmsis
122. See United States v. Morrison,120 S. Ct. 11 (1999) (grantingcertiorari).Amici curiae
representing36 states filed briefs arguingthat the civil rightsremedyin the Violence Against
WomenAct did not impingeon states'rights.See LindaGreenhouse,JusticesCool to Law ProJan.12,2000, at A18 (notingthat an additionalstate, Alabama,had
tectingWomen,N.Y. TIMES,
filed a briefon the other side).
123. Scholarshave noted and criticizedthe SupremeCourtfor failingto identifythe "values" upon whichit is relying,see, e.g., Brown,supranote 24, at 1518 (bemoaningthe fact that
the Court has not taken a "standon what values the structuralprovisionsof the Constitution
should promote"), even though scholars disagree among themselves about the appropriate
"values."Compareid. (emphasizingthe importanceof due processand individualrights),with
Flaherty,supra note 29 (emphasizingthe importanceof structuralbalance as essential to the
Framers'understandingof separation),and with Cass R. Sunstein,Constitutionalism
After the
New Deal, 101 HARV.L. REV. 421, 434-36 (1987) [hereinafterSunstein, Constitutionalism]
(listinga varietyof policiesinformingthe separationof powers,includingthe ruleof law, limited
government,andindividualliberty).
124. See, e.g., Morrisonv. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 695 (1988) (reasoningthat the IC does not
"disrupt[]the properbalance"of power (quotingNixon v. Administratorof Gen. Servs., 433
U.S. 425, 443 (1977)));Bowsherv. Synar,478 U.S. 714, 779 (1985) (Blackmun,J., dissenting)
(describingthe majority'sdecision as holdingthat "the ComptrollerGeneral'sfunctionsunder
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of importancein the real world. There are strong argumentsthat the
Constitutionitself mixes functions,25 enjoinsthe departmentsto cross
boundaries,126and grants too much power to some departments.127In
this world of cancelingargumentsand quotations,many have simply
thrownup their hands and claimedthat the separationof powers cannot be important.'

A vertical approachreplies that the separationof powers is important,and it is importantfor this reason:the dangerlies in shifting
the incentives of those who govern in ways that may silence or amplify some popular voices at the expense of others.'29The question
thus becomes one of who will wield authorityand what risks and incentives that shift in decisionmakerentails for constitutionalrelationships between the people and their governors.Statutesmay shift decithe ...

Act were constitutionally incompatible with the ...

removal provision" (emphasis

added));INS v. Chadha,462 U.S. 919, 962 (1982) (statingthat the boundariesof the departmentsare set by "'commonsense and ... inherentnecessities"'(quotingJ.W.Hampton& Co. v.
United States,276 U.S. 394,406 (1928)).
125. For example,the powerto name executiveofficersis generallyconceivedof as an executive power,yet the Constitutionallocatesthis power to both the Presidentand the Senate.
art.II, ? 2, cl. 2 ("He shall... nominate,and by and withthe Advice and ConSee U.S. CONST.
sent of the Senate... all other Officersof the United States.... "). Similarly,the power to adjudicateis generallyconceived of as a power held by the judiciary,yet the Senate adjudicates
impeachmentproceedings.See id. art. I, ? 3, cl. 6 ("TheSenate shallhave the sole Powerto try
all Impeachments.").
126. The presidentialveto is the classiccheck againstlegislativepower.See id. art. I, ? 7, cl.
2; see also THEFEDERALIST
NO. 51, supranote 25, at 350 (referringto the Senate'srole in apofficers
as a "qualified"connection between the Senate and the
various
executive
pointing
President,bolsteringthe strengthof the presidencyvis-h-visthe Congress).For a sophisticated
analysisof the checkingtheory,see Greene,supranote 24.
127. The Antifederalistsbelieved,for example,thatthe Presidenthad far too muchpower,a
sentimentthat has been emphasizedby a varietyof others at differentpoints in history.For a
modem claim that the Presidentis too powerful,see Flaherty,supra note 29, at 1727-29(observingthat the executivebranchhas never been more powerfulthansince the New Deal). For
a criticalanalysisof this view of the presidencyin general,see MichaelFitts, TheParadoxof
Power in the Modern State: Why a Unitary, Centralized Presidency May Not Exhibit Effective or

LegitimateLeadership,144 U. PA. L. REV.827, 835-36(1996) (arguingthat claimsof the imperial presidencyoverlook the ways in which a unitaryexecutive actuallymakes the Presidenta
good bit weakerthanhe mightotherwiseseem).
128. See, e.g., Lloyd N. Cutler, Some Reflections About Divided Government, 18
STUD. Q. 485 (1988) (arguing that a parliamentary system shares power more
PRESIDENTIAL

effectively).
129. My use of the metaphorof voice and my emphasison constituencyshouldnot be confused with the argumentthat voice is an end, ratherthan a means. Power is not conversation
(even metaphorically);it entails real risksto real lives and to governmentalstructure.But see
Laura S. Fitzgerald, Cadenced Power: The Kinetic Constitution, 46 DUKE L.J. 679 passim (1997)

(characterizingthe power of the constitutionalconstituenciesas the power of argumentand
"conversation").

1999]

THE VERTICALSEPARATION OF POWERS

783

sionmaking from smaller to larger constituencies or from larger to
smaller ones; they may shift a decision from no constituencyat all to
the most local of constituencies. In these shifts, we can see relative
changes in political incentives and thus increases or decreases in
structuralrisk. The incentives and risks here are to a "form"of government-whether the governmentwill be more inclined to veer toward rule by the few or by the many.Moving a governmentaldecision
to a more politically independent body, for example, may increase
decisionmakers'incentives toward elitist solutions (rule by the few at
the expense of the many).'" Moving in the opposite direction, to a
more politically dependent body, may decrease decisionmakers'incentives toward elitism, but may increase incentives to oppress minorities (rule by the many at the expense of the few).
The importanceof structuralincentives and risks is not only evident from an understandingof constitutionaltext'3' and history'32but
also consistent with modern economic understandingsof the dynamics of institutions.As Neil Komesarhas discussedat length, there are
two risks facing every institutionalchoice.'33The first risk is minoritarian in character-the risk that concentrated interests will gain at
the expense of dispersedmajorities.'34
(I have also labeled this risk as
the risk of rule by the "elite,"in an effort to link it explicitlyto a form
of government and yet to emphasize that the evil sought to be
avoided is that the few will prefer themselves over the many). The
second, countervailingrisk is majoritarian-that concentratedinter-

130. This is a rough approximation,but it seems fair to say that when Congressseeks to
move its own decisions to an "independent"decisionmaker,for example, there are increased
risksthat the popularwill may be thwarted.This riskappliesregardlessof whetherthe shiftis to
the IC or the SentencingCommission;the separationof powersquestionthen becomeswhether
the riskis offset by countervailingincentivesor protections.See infranote 184 (discussingcountervailingprotectionsrelied upon by the Schor Courtto upholdthe assignmentof adjudicatory
powerto the CommodityFuturesTradingCommission("CFTC")).
131. See infratext accompanyingnotes 187-89.
132.

See generally Nourse, supra note 10, passim (discussing The Federalist Papers). For my

responseto argumentsthat the verticalapproachis not supportedby history,see infratext accompanyingnotes 189-94.
133. See KOMESAR,supra note 15, at 65-82; see also Richard Pierce, Public Utility Regulatory Takings: Should the Judiciary Attempt to Police the Political Institutions?, 77 GEO. L.J. 2031,

2041-42 (1989) (followingKomesar'stwo-forcemodel of politics). ProfessorKomesarhas developed this idea in a series of articles.See, e.g., Komesar,Job for Judges,supranote 53, at 66872 (discussingtwo notionsof politicalmalfunction).
134. See Komesar,Job for Judges,supranote 53, at 671 ("Minoritarian
bias supposesan inordinatepowerof the few at the expense of the many.").
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ests will be victimized by powerful majorities.'35
Catalyzed by subof
in the political
interests
groupscapable easy organization,majority
market can use voting to prefer themselves,oppressingunpopularindividuals or minorities.'36
(I have also labeled this risk as the risk of
rule by the mob, again in an effort to link it to a form of government
and yet to emphasize that the evil sought to be avoided is that the
many will preferthemselvesto the few).
B. ShiftingConstituencies:The ComparativeNatureof Vertical
Analysis
For the vertical approachto work at all, it requiresan explicitly
comparative analysis. Simply because we move a decision from a
larger to a smaller constituencydoes not mean that we will veer toward aristocracy,nor does it mean that the decisionmakerwill, in fact,
favor a particularconstituency.It may mean (all other things being
equal), a relativechange in certainkinds of structuralincentives.The
furtherthe decision is taken from the hands of political authority,the
more insulated the decisionmakeris from politics, the risk of elitism
increases (i.e., the risk that the decision will disregardthe popular
will), but the risk of oppressiondecreases (i.e. the risk that the decision will disregardminority interests). By contrast, the greater the
move toward political authority and away from independence, the
risk of elitism decreases, and the risk to individualor minorityrights
increases."'37

On one level, this kind of analysisis very well known138and yet,
on anotherit is elusive. We have known, and many have argued,that
bias can be definedas an opposite responseto the same
135. See id. at 672 ("Majoritarian
skeweddistributionof impactswhichcharacterizedminoritarianbias.").
136. See id. at 668 ("Two visions of politicalmalfunction--onestressingfear of the many
and the other stressingfear of the few--coexist in our traditionalviews of government....
[B]oth conceptionsare viable representationsof seriouspoliticalmalfunctionapplicableto difsee also Neil K. Komesar,Pathsof
ferentbut importantinstancesof politicaldecisionmaking.");
Influence-Beard Revisited,56 GEO.WASH.L. REV.124, 126 (1987) ("Oneconceptionemphasizes the undueinfluenceof the manyto the detrimentof the few (majoritarian
bias);the other
of
few
to
detriment
of
the
the
influence
the
undue
the
many
(minoritarian
bias).").
emphasizes
137. Thus, as a general,albeit highlysimplified,rule, shiftsfrom the Presidentor the Congress to the courtsincreaserisksof elitismbut decreaserisksof oppression.Shiftsin the opposite direction,from the courtsto the Presidentor to Congress,increasethe risksof oppression
but decreasethe risksof elitism.These risks,it is importantto note, are neitherisolatednor exclusive.It is possibleto have a case, for example,in whichshiftingconstituenciesincreasesthe
risksof oppressionandelitism.Seesupratext accompanyingnote 106 (discussingthe IC case).
138. My version of political risk differsfrom much legal theory only to the extent that it
does not singleout a particularkind of politicalmalfunction,majoritarianor minoritarianbias,

1999]

THE VERTICALSEPARATION OF POWERS

785

We have
individualrights are at issue in separationof powers cases."'39
also known that accountabilityfigures in separation of powers cases.
What a vertical approachadds is that these are not simply static values, but a reflection of shiftingpolitical relationships,that these risks
are relative, and that they may be linked. Accountabilityarguments
fail to distinguishbetween accountable decisionmakers:members of
Congress and the Presidentdo not representthe same constituencies
and therefore are not responsivein the same ways. Accountabilityarguments also fail to account for countervailingrisks-that more accountability may mean greater risk to individuals."4Similarly,individual rights arguments often fail to grant any ground to shifting
structuralconcernsand to recognize that solutions protectingindividual rightsmay end up sacrificingmajoritywill.
The vertical approach rejects the hope of formalists and functionalists alike that we can arrive at a settled vision of the ideal departmentalstructureand work from there to evaluate shifts in power.
It is explicitlyand designedlya "transitionargument"looking at shifts
in power, not a final end state of affairsor a departmentalessence.'41
Such argumentsare "inherentlycomparative."'42
There has been too
much ink spilled on whether a particularfunction really is executive,
on what is the meaning of the Vesting Clauses, and on which quotation from Madisonis really the better one. The vertical approachexplicitly seeks to make the analysis more modest and yet more
groundedby analyzinghow a shift in decisionmakerschanges governors' incentives.'43
My claimis not that the verticalapproachis "true,"
but considersboth. See KOMESAR,
bias is
supranote 15, at 213-15;see id. at 214 ("Minoritarian
as serioussystemicpoliticalmalfunctionas is majoritarianbias. In both instances,importantinterests are unrepresented."); cf. JOHNHART ELY, DEMOCRACY
AND DISTRUST:A THEORYOF

ch. 4 (1980) (focusingon the risksof what I wouldcall oppression-that miJUDICIAL
REVIEW,
noritieswill not be representedin the politicalprocessand, therefore,shouldbe "virtuallyrepresented"by the courts).
139. The leadingscholaron this positionis RebeccaBrown.See Brown,supranote 24.
140.

Compare Harold H. Bruff, On the Constitutional Status of the Administrative Agencies,

36 AM.U. L. REV.491, 506-08(1987) (arguingthat clarityof politicalaccountabilitymayjustify
decisionssuchas Chadhaand Bowsher),withFlaherty,supranote 29, at 1834-36(rejectingthe
notion that accountabilityrequiresresultslike those in Bowsherand Chadha).
141.

See CHARLESTAYLOR,PHILOSOPHICAL
ARGUMENTS54 (1995):

A foundationalargumentto the effect thatY is the correctthesis showsits superiority
over the incompatiblethesis X only incidentally.... It is crucialto transitionarguments that they make a more modest claim. They are inherentlycomparative.The
claimis not that Y is correctsimpliciterbutjust that whateveris 'ultimatelytrue,'Y is
better thanX. It is, one mightsay, less false.
142. Id.
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as much as that it simplyis a better proxy than functionaldescription
for assessingstructuralrisk.44
As Charles Black told us, political relationshipdrives constitutional power and practice.The House memberfrom the Twenty-fifth
districtof Texas "lives and dies [based] on what they think of him in
the Twenty-fifthTexas."'145
The vertical analysisassumesthat there is
a relativelygreater risk that the member of the Twenty-fifthDistrict
will focus on his smallerconstituency'sdesiresthan that the President
or the courts will focus on the parochialdesires of the Twenty-fifth.
This claim should not be controversialas a relative matter, but it
should be rememberedthat it is a relativematter.The member from
the Twenty-fifthwill not always representonly the Twenty-fifth,and
the Presidentmay under some circumstancessacrificeother interests
to protect the Twenty-fifth.However, from the perspectiveof structuralincentive,the memberfrom the Twenty-fifthposes a more likely
risk, relative to the President, that he will favor the interests of the
Twenty-fifth.
For some, no doubt, this will create confusion and suggest cynicism. Does not the member from the Twenty-fifthhave a duty to the
nation as well, she will ask? Of course, but the verticalapproachdoes
not urge to the contrary.To say that the member from the Twentyfifth derives his political authority from the Twenty-fifth does not
mean that he may aid and abet Abu Nidal. It is to say that he has no
constitutionalauthorityto cast the votes of the citizens of the Third
District of Massachusettsor those of the President.That the member
from the Twenty-fifthhas overlappingconstitutionalobligationsdoes
not change his constitutionallyprescribedconstituency;his oath of office cannot make the member from the Twenty-fifthinto the President or the Congressor the Senatorfrom the state of Alaska. Only a
change in the Constitutionor his constituencycan do that.

143. The skepticmight argue,for example,that if I am looking for shiftingpower, I must
start somewhereto determinethat shift. Indeed, I must start with a baseline.Admittedly,and
purposefully,I begin from what I take to be an uncontroversialstatus quo. Errors,of course,
might be made at the start althoughthese may be reducedto the extent my analysiscontemat the start.See infratext acplates that one shouldacknowledgedoubtsaboutcharacterization
167.
note
companying
144. For an argumentthat current"functional"approachesare not as good a proxy,see infra PartIII.C.
145. CharlesL. Black, Jr., The WorkingBalanceof the AmericanPoliticalDepartments,1
HASTINGS
CONST.
L.Q. 13, 16-17(1974).
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Put another way, my argumentis not about representationas a
fact, but representationas an incentive and as a political principle.To
say that a shift from one institution to another shifts political constituencies is not a claim that those constituencies will actually be
heard or that they will not be betrayed.I am not arguing,nor do I believe, that the Presidentalwaysrespondsto the nation's will any more
than membersof Congressalwaysbow to the desires of their districts
or states. The vertical approachdoes not require,however, that representativesreceive accoladesfor their representation-it simplyprovides us a sense of the likely stakes and incentives of structural
change. The vertical approachassumes that political officials have a
structuralincentive to be parochialand that they will speak to and be
influenced by their constituentsin making their decisions.'46
That asreflects
the
of
structural
If
men
were
sumption
purpose
protections.
we
would
need
none.147At the same time, assessmentof strucangels,
turalrisk cannot solve every problemof constitutionalrepresentation.
If representativesbetray their constituents'true interests on any particular issue,'" there is little that the separationof powers can do to
146. The notion that representativesrespondto the intereststhat will reelect them is a staF. FENNO,JR.,HOMESTYLE:
ple of muchlegal theoryand politicalscience.See, e.g., RICHARD
HOUSEMEMBERS
IN THEIRDISTRICTS
8 (1978) (emphasizingmembers'reelection constituVOTINGDECISIONS17 (1989) (emphasizing the
ency); JOHNW. KINGDON,CONGRESSMEN'S

influencesof constituentsand colleagueson voting decisions);Black, supranote 145, at 16-17;
Bruff,supranote 140, at 508 ("Thepoliticalresponsibilityof membersof Congressis mostlyindividual.... [and]the recordof individualactionscertainlydominatesreelectioncampaigns.").
There are, of course, competingtheories--economic and institutional-about the reasons for
politicalaction.My claimis only the minimalone that few membersdo or shouldvote without
FENICHEL
THE
regardto, or against,the interestsof those they represent.See HANNAH
PITKIN,
CONCEPT
OFREPRESENTATION
166 (1967) ("The representativemust act in such a way that,
althoughhe is independent,and his constituentsare capableof actionandjudgment,no conflict
arises between them. He must act in their interest,and this means that he must not normally
come into conflictwith theirwishes.").
147.

See THE FEDERALISTNO. 51, supra note 25, at 1 ("If men were angels, no government

would be necessary.If angels were to govern men, neither externalnor internalcontroulson
governmentwould be necessary.").On the Humeanresonance,see Nourse, supra note 10, at
480 ("MakingHumean'bad men... act for the publicgood' is preciselythe goal of Madison's
'policy of supplyingby opposite and rival interests,the defect of better motives."'(footnotes
omitted)). Even those committedto the republicanideal recognize,I believe rightly,that the
Framerssought,in structure,an "auxiliaryprotection,"in case men did not act with virtue.See
MICHAELJ. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'SDISCONTENT:AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A PUBLIC
PHILOSOPHY
129 (1996) ("[T]he Constitution did not seek to elevate the moral character of the

people.... Instead,it soughtinstitutionaldevicesthatwould save the republicangovernmentby

making it less dependent on the virtue of the people.").
148. See Michael J. Klarman, Majoritarian Judicial Review: The Entrenchment Problem, 85

GEO. L.J. 491 passim (1997) (arguingthat judicial review may serve majoritarianpurposes
where representativesact contraryto the preferencesof theirconstituents).Thatrepresentation
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rectify that;all that the separationof powers can achieve is to reduce
particularstructuralincentives,not all politicalrisks.
C. TheSilentDemandsof the FunctionalIdeal
Even with these caveats, the question still remainswhether such
a vertical approachreally works. There is reason to believe, for example, that the inquiry can be quite complex. Cases may involve
more than one risk-of majoritarianand minoritarianbias.149Similarly, identificationof the risks is only the first step in the process.
One must still ask if the structuralscheme as a whole creates a substantial risk unmitigatedby other structuralfeatures.'5The skeptic
will ask, of course, whether,given the difficulties,the projectis worth
the candle.
It would be enough, I believe, if the verticalapproachhelped us
to see with greaterclaritythe connection between shiftingpower and
constitutionalharm. But, if the reader has gotten this far, she also
knows that I believe that this kind of inquirymeritsattentionon other
accounts as well. Unlike conventional approaches,vertical analysis
does not commit us to an ideal that keeps us, as currentapproaches
do, lurchingfrom claims that no governmentalinnovationis possible
to claims that all innovationis permissible."'It does not obscure importantshifts in political power, deny the individualnature of the departments,152or aspire to a constitutionalunity that is overstated or
false.'53It is republicanl54and, at the same time, does not depend upon

createsotherkindsof governmentalrisksdoes not underminemy claimthatrisksof elitismand
oppressionare those that structureseeks most obviouslyto protectagainst-it simplysuggests
that theremay be otherwaysin whichwe mightwantto correctfor representationalfailure.
149. See supraPartII (discussingMorrisonandJones).
150. For example,as I arguebelow,the SupremeCourt'sdecisionin Schoris a case in which
the Courtfound the risk of increasedpoliticizationto be minimalrelativeto the availableprotections.See infranotes 177,184.
151. I am referringhere to the factthatconventionaltheoreticalviewstend to lead to results
ratherthanrationales.See Tushnet,supranote 27, at 584 ("Formalistopinionsalmostinvariably
strikedownlegislation;functionalopinionsalmostinvariablyupholdit.").
152. See infra text accompanyingnote 174 (arguingthat conventionalapproachesmistakenly treatthe departmentsas fungible).
153. See supranotes 35, 125 (arguingthat the Constitutionitself does not providefunctionally unifieddepartments).
154. To say that this theory is republicanis simplyto say that we have a governmentthat
mediatespopulardesire throughrepresentation.See PrrKIN,supranote 146, at 194 (describing
Madison'spositionthat in a republic,unlikea democracy,"thereis representation:government
is delegatedto a few men by the rest").
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civic virtue or altruisticregard for others."' It is textual, yet at the
same time, it avoids the literalismdemandedby those who believe the
only important text to be the terms "executive," "legislative,"and
It is grounded in the realism of political practice, but a
"judicial."'56
realismthat is more than simply deference to the momentarywisdom
of politicalmajorities.'57Most importantly,however, it does not ask us
to embracea theory of political power that rejects the ultimatesovereignty of the people.
The verticalapproachmay not be ideal, but it is, I believe, better
than functional analysis alone. It is a better proxy for what function
aims to mirror. Functional analysis aims to maintain constancy of
structure,to avoid the risks of which I have written,but it aims to do
so by imposing labels that the Constitutionitself defies. In the end,
the problem with functional analysis is its failure to recognize that
"function"is a proxy for a whole set of constitutionalfeaturesthat the
approachaims to link by ever more general descriptions.In a sense,
we might have known this-it seems very odd that a set of three
words-executive, legislative, and judicial--could ever come to comprehend the rest of the Constitution.The results of this effort, perhaps predictably,risk begging the question,"58
underminingthe project,159 and rendering Supreme Court case law hopelessly
irreconcilable.160

Conventionalapproachestell us, for example, that we cannot decide separationof powers cases without labelingthe innovationor the
departmentsas executive, judicial, or legislative.'61The very form of
the inquiryseems to beg the question:"function-talk"suggests,in advance, that there is some conceptual unity in functional description,
155.

See GEOFFREYR. STONEET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 5 (1991) (equating early re-

publicanargumentswith "civicvirtue-the willingnessof citizens to subordinatetheir private
intereststo the generalgood"). My analysisproceedson the more desperate,but realistic,assumptionof Madison(who borrowedit from Hume) that structureis best protectedby assuming thatthose who governare far from"angels."
156. For a discussionof the textualargument,see infratext accompanyingnotes 187-89.
157. See infratext accompanyingnote 197 (arguingthat those who seek to deferto political
voices on structuralquestionsdo not abstainfrom,but participatein, politics).
158. See infratext accompanyingnotes 161-64(discussinghow conventionalapproachesassume functionalunity).
159. See infratext accompanyingnotes 161-68(discussinghow the functionalaim to describe
the departmentsundercutsits criticalambitions).
160. See infra text accompanyingnotes 174-87 (discussinghow the Bowsher case and the
Schorcase may simplyraisedifferentrisks).
161. See supratext accompanyingnotes 17-36(discussinghow conventionalapproachesare
committedto the functionalideal).
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however roughly defined. Right at the start, we become tacitly committed to the idea that something needs to be justified about a governmentalprocess that involves more than one functionor appearsto
cross functional boundaries-even though the Constitutionitself defies this ideal.'62It is no wonder that we have ended up talkingabout
the "unity"of the departments,since the very assumptionthat the
departmentsare functionsseems to presupposethe possibilityof such
a unity.'63
It is also no wonder that the Supreme Courthas never had
the will to impose such a vision: if all the powers of the executive
must be executive, does the President's veto become unconstitutional?
Because traditional approaches trade on the categorical, they
also fail by the categorical.Panic eruptswhen a governmentalinnovation does not fit within the bordersof a particulardepartment-when
the legislative veto may be describedin more than one way,'6 when
the Sentencing Commissionseems to be heir to the powers of both
judges and legislators,165when the ComptrollerGeneral is tied to the
Congress but performs something that looks like execution.'" Unbound by metaphorsimplicitlydemandingthat a power cannot be in
two places or performtwo functionsat the same time, the verticalapproach allows us to assess what contemporarydepartmentalmetaphors suggest is inherentlyimpossible-overlapping risks. Indeed, in
cases like Morrison,we can see quite clearly that there is more than
one risk at stake-that there are risks both of elitism and of oppression, to individualrightsand to majoritywill.
Vertical analysis thus gives us a way to examine structuralrisk
without getting bollixed up at the beginning in questions about the
162. See supranotes 35, 125 (discussingthe waysin whichthe Constitutionviolatesthe functionalideal).
163. Indeed,muchscholarlyworkin the past decadehas tended to focus on, or to respond
to, the notion of a "unitary"executive.See, e.g., StephenG. Calabresi,Some NormativeArguments for the Unitary Executive, 48 ARK. L. REV. 23, 36-37 (1995) (concluding that the current

governmentalsituation"virtuallymandatesthe creationof a much strongerand more unitary
presidency");Calabresi& Rhodes,supranote 31, passim (arguingfor a unitaryexecutivetheory). But cf Lessig & Sunstein,supranote 25, at 118-19(arguingthat the historicalevidence
does not supporta unitaryexecutivetheorybut that it may be an appropriate"translation"of
the historicalrecord).
164. See supranote 21 (notingthe disputewithinthe SupremeCourtabout how to characterize the legislative veto); see also supra note 36 (discussingother categorizationdisputes
amongthe Justices).
165. See Mistrettav. United States,488 U.S. 361,383-84(1989).
166. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 717-21, 726 (1986).
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inherent incompatibilityof multifunctionalism.Political relationships
may change, overlap, and create risks without requiring,in advance,
that the danger lie in the very concept we are using to solve the
problem. For example, a case like Mistrettamay be analyzedwithout
engagingin a franticsearchfor the "location"or the "function"of the
Sentencing Commission.'6Since we are not searchingfor a function
or a location,we may contemplatenot a single risk, but multipleones.
We can consider that the Sentencing Commission was to be performing tasks typically undertaken by the legislature (raising questions about shifts from state and local constituencies to more independent ones), as well as by the courts (raisingquestions about risks
runningin the opposite direction from an independent body to one
with relatively greater electoral ties). Indeed, we may even consider
that the statute shifted power from the Congressto individualfederal
prosecutorspotentiallyraisingrisks of both oppressionand elitism.
If this is right,it may help to free us from the all-or-nothingpositions suggested by contemporarydoctrine. Vertical analysis specifically contemplatesthat some governmentalinnovationsmay be consistent with sound structuralimperatives,while other innovationsmay
not. Judgmentswill have to be made about the natureof the risks and
about whether the statutoryscheme protects adequatelyagainstthose
risks. In some cases, the risks to constituencymay be clear. Few believe, for example, that the President should have the power to write
specific districtsor states out of the Constitution.At the same time,
there may be cases where the risks to political voice are more formal
than real. In cases like CommodityFutures Trading Commissionv.
for example, the Supreme Court found that various proceSchor,"68
dures (administrativelaw judge ("ALJ") insulation, appeal rights,
etc.) reducedthe risk of politicizationinherentin shiftingadjudication
from the courts to an executive agency.169This means, of course, that
judgmentcalls will have to be made in applyingsuch a theory. But in
a world in which our major theoretical approaches are widely believed to be corruptand result-oriented,17
it hardlyseems a conclusive
167.

See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 384-86.

168. 478 U.S. 833 (1986).
169. See id. at 836 (notingthat the "broadregulatorypowersof the CEA were most appropriatelyvested in an agency which would be relativelyimmunefrom the 'politicalwinds that
sweep Washington"'(quotingH.R. REP.NO. 93-975,at 44, 70 (1974)));see also id. at 855-56
(discussingthe decisionby Congressto grantthe CFTCjurisdictionover CEA claimsbecauseof
its perceivedimmunityfrompoliticalpressures).
170.

See, e.g., Elliott, supra note 22, at 512; Tushnet, supra note 27, at 584.
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argumentthat there may be some uncertaintyinvolved.No nontrivial
theory is free from judgmentcalls."' The best that we can ask is that,
at the very least, we are askingbetter questions,questionsthat do not
invite particularanswersfrom the start.
Because the vertical analysisbreaks through some of the metaphoricalcommitmentsof conventionalapproaches,it allows us to see
issues that conventionaltheory tends to obscure. Indeed, the vertical
approachallows us to see shifts in power that are virtuallyimpossible
to see from the perspectiveof conventionalapproachesto the separation of powers. Typically, courts see shifts in power as "contestable"-as questionsof the separationof powers-when there appears
to be "mixing"involved,when a "location"has shifted,or when a deIt is rare that a court even conpartmentacquiresa new "function."172
siders the possibility that shifts in power may occur by means other
than a reassignmentof legal authority.But, as my hypotheticalconstitution makes quite clear, shifts in power may be accomplishedby
other means. For example, changingthe mode of appointingpersonnel who make governmentaldecisions may accomplishrather dra-

maticshiftsin politicalpower.173

Conventionaltheory tends to obscure such shifts because it assumes departmentalfungibility.If one is worried about mismatched
functions or crossed boundaries,then there is no relevant difference
between granting executive authorityto the Congress or legislative
authority to the courts-both arrangementsimproperlymix powers
or functions.Conventionaltheory thus assumesthat the departments
are the same thing-cogs in the great constitutionalmachineor places
on a constitutionalgeography.Vertical analysis proceeds upon precisely the opposite assumption-it assumes that the departmentsare
differentbecause they representdifferentconstituencies.As a result,
a shift from the Congressto the courts does not necessarilypose the
same risksas a shift from the Presidentto Congress.
Once this is understood,it is also possible to see that the conventional academicanalysisof the SupremeCourt'scases may have actually helped to create the "mess" that academics condemn.174Cases
that seem to present inherent inconsistenciesmay simply turn out to
171. See ELY, supra note 138, at 62.

172. See Mistrettav. United States,488 U.S. 361, 383-86(1989).
173. See supra text accompanyingnotes 61-67 (discussingthe potentialof a proposalthat
wouldpermitCongressto appointexecutiveofficers).
see supranote 23.
174. On the "mess"characterization,
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be "different."Consider the classic opposition in the literature between two cases, decided the same day, which appear to stand in
stark, irreconcilableopposition. Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor75is widely known as an opinion that sits on the liberal, realist side of the separation of powers canon.176At issue in
Schor was whether an administrativeagency could adjudicateclaims.
Finding no substantialinterferencewith the function of the judiciary,
the Court affirmedthe arrangement."'But on the same day, in Bowsher v. Synar,78the Supreme Court, faced with a similar functional
clash, applied a far more formal analysis179and struck down the
Gramm-Rudman-HollingsBudget Act,'8 on the grounds that it improperlymixed executive and legislativepowers.
From the perspectiveof function, Bowsher and Schor appear irIn one, the Supreme Court affirms a functional misreconcilable.'81
match between the executive and judiciary;in the other, the Court
rejects a functionalmismatchbetween a congressionalofficer and an
executive function. From the vertical perspective,however, Bowsher
175. 478 U.S. 833 (1986).
176. See, e.g., Bruff, supra note 140, at 502-03 (contrastingSchor with various formalist
cases);Verkuil,supranote 24, at 312 (notingthat Schoremploysa functionalanalysis).But cf
Peter E. Quint, Reflections on the Separation of Powers and Judicial Review at the End of the

ReaganEra,57 GEO.WASH.L. REV.427,445 n.74 (1989)(claimingthat Schor'sdeferentialattitude may have suggestedflexibilityonly with respect to "Congressin its allocationof judicial
powerbetweenArticle III courtsand otherjudicialor quasi-judicialagencies").
177. See Schor,478 U.S. at 851-52("An examinationof the relativeallocationof powersbetween the CFTC and Article III courts in light of the considerationsgiven prominencein our
precedentsdemonstratesthat the congressionalscheme does not impermissiblyintrudeon the
provinceof the judiciary.").
178. 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
179. Bowsherhas becomeknown as a ratherformalisticopinion.See SuzannaSherry,Separation of Powers: Asking a Different Question, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 287, 292-93 (1987)

("The majorityin Bowsherdivided all possible governmentalpowers and governmentofficers
into three categories-legislative, executive, and judicial-and demandeda perfect match between the power and the officer. Each branchwas requiredto be 'separateand wholly independent."'(quotingBowsher,478 U.S. at 722)).
180. BalancedBudget and EmergencyDeficit ControlAct of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-177,99
Stat.1038.
181.

See Harold J. Krent, Separating the Strands in Separation of Powers Controversies, 74

VA. L. REV.1253, 1255 (1988) (highlightingthe "substantialinconsistency"between the Bowsher and the Schorapproaches).CompareSchor,478 U.S. at 851 (reasoningthat applying"formalisticand unbendingrules"to structuralcontroversiesmay "undulyconstrictCongress'ability to take needed and innovativeaction pursuantto its Article I powers"),withBowsher,478
U.S. at 736 ("'[T]hefact that a given law or procedureis efficient,convenient,and useful in facilitatingfunctionsof government,standingalone, will not save it if it is contraryto the Constitution."'(quotingI.N.S.v. Chadha,462 U.S. 919, 944 (1983))).
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and Schor are simply differentcases; indeed, they pose precisely the
opposite risks. Bowsher involves a shift from a more to a less politically tied decisionmaker-from a budget decision made by the Congress and the Presidentto a budget decision by an agent with no conSchor involves a shift from a less to a more politicallytied
stituency.'82
decisionmaker-from the judiciaryto an ALJ within the executive
department.183

The vertical approachmakes it clear that we need look not only
at where power goes to, but also where it comes from. It is not
enough, as some functionalapproachessuggest,simply to look at the
departmentin which the decision ends. In both Bowsher and Schor,
power seems to have been granted to relativelyindependent agents:
the ALJ in Schor and the ComptrollerGeneralin Bowsher.But these
independent agents gained decisionmakingauthorityfrom very different decisionmakersand that explains the differencein the relative
risks presented by these cases. Shifting power from courts to ALJs
raises a risk of increasingpoliticization.The risk is that the ALJ has
relativelystrongerincentivesthan a judge to follow the call of politics
in decidingthe case.'mBy contrast,Bowsherraises preciselythe opposite risk: a risk of decreasingpoliticization. The budget act shifted
power to decide budget matters from Congress to an independent
agent and, in the process, cut the President out of any final budget
The shift in constituencyin Bowshermoves from the most
decision.'85
182. The issue in Bowsherwas whether the ComptrollerGeneral, an independentagent,
could be grantedthe power to make final decisionsshouldthe Congressand the Presidentdisagree upon how to cut the budgetto meet appropriatelevels. See Bowsher,478 U.S. at 717-18,
720.
183. One mightarguethatthe ALJ is insulatedfrompoliticalpressures.That,however,does
not answerthe questionof relativeinfluence.As I have arguedabove, thereis no questionthat
relativelythere are more politicalinfluenceson an ALJ than on an ArticleIII court--and that is
the appropriaterisk assessmenthere. See supranote 106 (describingthe potentialinfluencesof
a Presidenton so-calledindependentagents).That the risk may be minimalgoes to its weight,
not its character.
184. The Courtdecided,ultimately,that the arrangementshouldstandbecauseit foundthis
incentiveto be relativelyweak and the correspondingprotectionsstrong.The Schor Courtrelied, for example,on the fact that the complainingpartyhad voluntarilyproceededbefore an
administrativetribunal,see 478 U.S. at 849-50, that the ALJ's orders were only enforceable
throughArticleIII courts,see id. at 852, and that the ALJ'slegal determinationswere subjectto
de novo review,see id. Thisreasoningmakeslittle sense as an answerto the functionalquestion:
none of these factorschangesthe fact that the ALJ is in fact performingthe functionof adjudication. Each of these factors,however, lessens the likelihood of, and serves as a protection
against,a politicizedALJ decision.
185. The real problemBowsherpresentsis whetherthe Presidentmay agreeto anticipatorily
alienatethe veto. The Budget Act at issue in Bowsherwas, in effect, an ex ante agreementbe-
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politicized offices (Congress and the President) to one of the least
politicized, the "independent"ComptrollerGeneral. The danger in
Schor was majoritarian,a risk that individualrights would be subject
to political will; the danger in Bowsher was minoritarian,a risk that
an important public decision would be made by a faceless bureaucrat.'86
D.

The Counterarguments

Although I have answered them in part above, there are three
objections and one question that I would like to face directly here.
First, there is the objection that the text of the Constitutionprecludes
the verticalapproach;second, that history bars it; and, third,that vertical analysisraises difficultpoliticalquestionsill-suitedto judicialdetermination.Finally, there is the remainingquestion about how this
approachfits into the existing academiccontroversybetween formalists and functionalists.
First, as for the textual objection, let me emphasize that my argument is textual. I have relied upon the text that creates the relationshipsof citizens to state and, throughthese relationships,between
departments."7To some, of course, this is not the right text because
the only "real"text is the text of the Vesting Clauses. That position
may be understandablegiven courts' and scholars'focus on constitutional interpretation.The words "legislative,""judicial,"and "executween the Presidentand the Congressto bar his exercise of the veto power over budget decisions withoutregardto what later conflictsmight arise between the nation's interestsand the
ComptrollerGeneral'sultimate budget decision. By cutting the Presidentout, Congressnot
only gave itself more power but also cut out a nationalconstituencyas the final "veto"decisionmaker(absent a supermajority).Few, I believe, would argue that the Presidentand the
Congresscan agree to forego the President'sveto. Once understoodthis way, Bowsher,like
Morrison,raisesissues far differentfromthe questionof "independent"officersand "removal,"
on whichthe Courtfocused.See Bowsher,478 U.S. at 722-26.
186. This conclusionholds whetherwe believe the ComptrollerGeneral to be an agent of
Congress,of the President,or somewherein between. However the ComptrollerGeneral is
characterized,the statute (as interpretedby the Court)would still leave the Presidentwithout
the veto powerat the time of the ComptrollerGeneral'sbudget-settingdecision.See supranote
185 (explaininghow Bowsherraisesrisksbeyond the mere "independence"of the Comptroller
General).For a differentargumentthat the categorizationissue is irrelevantbased on an "aggrandizement"rationale,see Greene, supra note 24, at 167; see also David Yassky, A TwoTiered Theory of Consolidation and Separation of Powers, 99 YALE L.J. 431, 447 (1989) (main-

tainingthat the ComptrollerGeneral'sstatusshouldhave had no bearingon the resultin Bowsher).

187. See, e.g., U.S. CONST.
art. I, ? 2, cl. 1 (providingfor the election of the membersof the
House of Representatives);id. art. I, ? 3, cl. 1 & amend. XVII (providingfor the election of
Senators);id. art. II, ? 1, cls. 2-3 & amend.XII (providingfor the election of the President).
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tive" seem far more capable of interpretationthan the electoral and
appointmentprovisionsin Articles I, II, and III. Yet, it hardlyseems
right to conclude that since these provisionsdo not appear as if they
need, or are conducive to, the kind of interpretationgiven to the
Vesting Clauses,they are for that reason less textual or less firm a basis for a government.'88If this is right,our continuedsearchfor the final meaning of judicial,legislative,and executive may not have given
us anythingbut an impoverishedsense of the text, at least one that
leaves out, in this case, anythingthat would actuallycreate a working
government.
Second, the historicalobjection is equally illuminatingabout the
That most historiesof
limits of relianceon modernfunctionalideals.'"89
the separationof powers are written with the concept of function in
mind'• does not tell us whether function means to us what it meant
during the eighteenth century or, perhaps more importantly,if its
meaningwas importantat all. The more evidence we gather,the more
we find that conventionalfunctionalmixturesthat would be unthinkable today were tolerated in early Americanhistory.'9'I have written
elsewhere that the idea of functionthat appearsin The FederalistPapers, for example, is far more influencedby political practicesof the

188. In this sense, the verticalapproachsuggestssome veryinterestingthingsaboutthe contemporaryfocus on constitutionalinterpretation.For if thatfocus tendsto pushus towardterms
in the Constitutionthat need interpretation,it may skew not only the questionsbut the answers
that we give about our Constitution;indeed,our searchfor an interpretivetheorymay have led
us to look only at the kindof text susceptibleto interpretation.
189. Of course,manyhave attemptedto locate historicalaims of the separationof powers
in places other than function.Indeed,they have writteneloquentlyof the fear of factions,conflicts of interest,and the need for balanceas well as efficiency.See, e.g., Flaherty,supranote 29,
supranote 123,at 430-32(discussingfaction
(consideringbalance);Sunstein,Constitutionalism,
and efficiency);Verkuil,supranote 24 (addressingthe rule of law). Thereare severalproblems
with extrapolationsfromsuch concerns.First,they are often statedat such a level of generality
that they pose little opportunityfor analysisof concreteproblems.See supranote 140 (discussing the concept of "accountability"as compatiblewith diametricallyopposed structuralarrangements).Second, these argumentsare often disconnectedfrom relevantpoliticalpractice.
See, e.g., Desan, supranote 33, at 1385 (emphasizingthe importanceof early politicalpractices
as importantfor understandingearly structuralarrangements);Nourse, supranote 10, passim
(arguingthat politicalpracticestell us muchabout the Federalist'sargumentson the separation
of powers).Finally,and perhapsmost importantlyfor my purposes,these theoriesall rely upon
commonassumptionsabout the natureof politicalpower;they assumethat shiftingpower is a
matterof shiftingabilityto commandratherthan shiftingpoliticalrelationships.See infraPart
IV.
190. See supranote 33 and accompanyingtext.
191. See Desan, supranote 33, at 1391-435(focusingon the early historyof the New York
Assemblyand its use of legislativeadjudication).
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time than we moderns understand.'92Indeed, I believe that a strong
argumentcan be made that Madison'skey insightin terms of political
structuremarriedmore traditionalideas of mixed governmentto the
new republic'soverlappingconstituencies.'93
If that is right, then, our
modern idea may have caused us to focus too much on historicalnotions of function and too little on relevant political practice. At the
very least, it supportsa shift in our thinkingso as to contemplatethe
role of constituency and political relationshipsin the separation of
powers.
Third, the practicalobjection.There will be those who urge that
courts cannot undertakethe vertical approach.Leaving aside for the
moment the fact that the vertical approachmay actuallydescribe the
Supreme Courts' reasoning in a number of cases,194 let me treat the
objection at its most general. It is believed by many that, since we
cannot know the "end" of the separation of powers, courts should
simply call these cases political questions and abstain from deciding
them.'95The vertical approachmakes clear, however, that the question of judicial review cannot be decided as if courts were taking the
To believe, as many do, that the Court can
"view from nowhere."196
out
of
stay
politics by ignoringseparationof powers challenges is not
to stay out of politics; rather,it is to affirma particularkind of politics.'97The Court's refusal to intervene is a claim that the political
branches have the final word on constitutionalstructure'"and that
192. See Nourse, supra note 10, at 453-63.
193. See id. at 481-82.

194. See supra notes 10, 114 (discussingJustice Kennedy'sspecific referenceto "vertical"
concerns);supratext accompanyingnotes 174-84(discussinghow a verticalapproachreconciles
the SupremeCourt'sanalysesin Bowsherand Schor).
195.

See, e.g., CHOPER,supra note 34, at 263-379 (arguing that separation of powers claims

should be nonjusticiable);Tushnet,supranote 27, at 596-97 (questioningwhetherjudges have
the knowledgeto understandpoliticsor to evaluateclaimsof shiftingpower).
196.

See THOMASNAGEL,THE VIEWFROMNOWHERE(1986) (addressing the problem of a

person inside the world attemptingto take an objectiveview of the worldof whichthey are a
part).
197. See Sunstein,Constitutionalism,
supranote 123, at 495 (arguingthat "[a]cquiescenceby
one branchto a redistributionof nationalpowersmay not prevent-indeed it may increase-the
dangerthat the new arrangementwill jeopardizesome of the purposesthat underliethe constitutionalstructure").
198. I suspectthat the commitmentto this position(borrowedfrom other debatesaboutjudicialreview) is likely to be skin deep. Wouldthe realistsreallysupportjudicialsilence, or deferentialreview,if the Presidentand the Congressagreedthat the Presidenthad no veto on such
matters as race discriminationor abortion?If there is any lesson that we have learned from
Morrison,it is that what may seem politicallywise, impartial,and sound in the short termmay
end up appearingquite differentin the long term.
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the courts are simply constitutionalbystanders.If we are to have a
constitution, the political departmentscannot simply choose a new
structurewhen the majoritysees fit to changeit.'"I would add that, if
we are to have courts, we cannot believe that they do not performa
role in the great institutionaldebates or that their role as political
outsiders does not contain both risks" and benefits. Law's voice
counts, too, in a republic-it counts, at the very least, as the voice of
caution, articulatingfor us the risks of what may seem at the moment
a wise and worthwhileproductof popularwill.201
To say that this invites courtsinto a politicalquagmireboth overstates the difficultyof the inquiryand understatesthe degree to which
the Court's "transcendentalist"view is already a political mess. To
see the risks of elitism and oppression,to which I have adverted,requires no Master'sdegree in political science or a penchantfor reading studies on congressionalvoting behavior.Albeit expressed somewhat differently, the risks that I have identified are quite standard
concepts in the general literature of constitutionallaw and theory,
even if they are not always seen together.' In the end, however, the
best claim I have for the verticalapproachis that it producesaccounts
that make more sense of the real constitutiverisks of shifting power
than an approachbased solely on the concept of function.

199. I makeno claimhere to providea full theoryof judicialreviewof separationof powers
questions.Indeed, I think that the question may be a difficultone, concerningwhether the
Courtis reallythe best institutionto decide certainkindsof structuraldisputes.I assume,as a
pragmaticmatter,however,that the SupremeCourt will continueto exercise review in some
structuralcases.
200. WhatI mean by this is that the very act of decidingthese cases, of engagingin judicial
intervention,may itself be an accretionof power that deservesscrutiny.Indeed,if there is any
truthto the accountin PartIII,it suggeststhat the Courthas failedtoo often to considerits own
role in separationof powerscontroversies.
201. As a practicalmatter,most separationof powersdisputesare resolvedon the political
playing field-an everyday matter in Washington. See LOUIs FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL
BETWEENCONGRESSANDTHEPRESIDENT299 (4th ed. 1997) (noting that "it is not
CONFLICTS

surprisingthat the meaningof separationof powershas for the most partdevelopedoutsidethe
courts.... [in] accommodationsworkedout by legislativeand executiveofficials").This is not,
however,an argumentagainstjudicialintervention;it simplyreflectsthe generaltruththatmost
disputesare neverresolvedby adjudication.Life, and separationof powersdisputes,most often
take place in the shadowof the law;however,at some pointthe law mustbe expoundedin order
to cast its shadow.
202. See ELY,supranote 138, at 68 (discussingpoliticalphilosophiesthat embraceelitism);
SANDEL,
supranote 147, at 128 (identifyingthe Framers'fears of an "excessof democracy").
But see Komesar,Job for Judges,supranote 53, at 668-72 (examiningboth kinds of political
malfunction).
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Finally, where does a vertical approachfit into current debates
on formalismand functionalism?To the extent that it looks for reasons to decide separationof powers controversies,it clearly belongs
in the functionalist camp. Unlike many functionalist approaches,
however, it does not give content to the idea of function by seeking
agreement upon a final picture of the departmentsor constitutional
structure.Rather, it posits an end in the expression of popular will.
This aims to be not only a more realistic approachbut also one that
does not depend upon the political majoritiesof the moment. Rather,
it is realist in the sense that functional argument,I believe, was intended to be-an argumentthat sees in abstractionthe source of oppression and confusion and posits a way of reinventing existing
thought patternsby reenvisioningthe relationsembodied in law. It is
realist in the sense that Felix Cohen imagined functionalismas criit is functionalistin the sense of Wesley Hohfeld and John
tique;203
Dewey, who emphasized the use of relational understandingsto rethink entrenchedconcepts."
IV. THE IDEA OF POWER AND THE COURTS' ROLE IN SEPARATION
OF POWERS CASES

Decades ago, one of the century's most distinguishedconstitutional scholars,Professor CharlesBlack, implored us to see that the
Constitutioncreates a set of political relationships.2" Surprisinglylittle of that understanding,however, seems to have informed contemporarydebates about the separationof powers in the SupremeCourt,
in the law reviews, or among scholars.In part, this may be due to the
fact that Professor Black focused on particularlydifficult relationships.2 More likely, however, such an understandinghas been disregarded because lawyers tend to see some constitutional relationships-particularly the ones I have identified here-as matters of
politics, not law.2" The resultingmisunderstanding,a very important
203. See supranote 28.
204. See JOHNDEWEY,How WETHINK134 (1991) (recommendingthat meaningmay be
more precise if we seek not to describestatic qualitiesbut, instead, "the way in whichcertain
things are causallyrelatedto other things,i.e.... a relation");Wesley N. Hohfeld, Some FundamentalLegal Conceptionsas Appliedin JudicialReasoning,23 YALEL.J.16, 20-22(1913) (offeringa vision of correlativeunderstandingsto understandlegal termsof art).
205. See BLACK,
supranote 37, at 3-32.
206. See, e.g., id. at 39-66 (makingargumentsbased on the relationshipsof state to nation
and citizento state).
207. What has been borrowedfrom ProfessorBlack'swork is not the idea of politicalrela-

800

DUKE LAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 49:749

one, is that somehow the politicalrelationshipscreatedby the Constitution are less certain or evident, and even less textual, than the
"real"constitutionallaw found in particulararticlesand clauses.208
The separationof powers debate is, in the end, a debate as much
about the structureof our governmentas about an idea of law and
politicalpower. To a lawyer,politicalpower is createdin the image of
law. Power is not the power to speak on behalf of others, as political
theorists tell us; instead, power is the power to command legitimately.' Shiftsin power do not shift constituenciesor politicalvoice,
but they shift the legal authorityto do something. This view, when
applied to the separationof powers, has kept our gaze on ratherlawyerly questions.Scholarsare obsessed with answeringquestionsabout
departmentalhierarchy210and the best interpretationof the terms of
the departments'grants of authority, the Vesting Clauses.21'Even
functionalists,who aim toward a more critical stance, borrow this
lawyerlyassumption.They simplywish to soften its implications.
The problemfor this lawyerlyideal is the one with which I began
this Article: it does very little actually to create a government.Neither the Vesting Clauses nor enumeratedpowers authorizethe vote
or create constituencies.As a result, they cannot create the kind of
relationshipsthat lawyers describe somewhat disdainfullyas "political" power. Law's vision of power as authorityor commandmay be
necessary to understandgovernmentalstructure,but it is not suffitionshipbut the idea of structuralargument.That,too, however,has an uncertainlegacy.While
arguments,there appearto be wide differences
many assertthat they are making"structural"
about what,precisely,structuralargumentis and what it supports.CompareCalabresi& Rhodes, supranote 31, at 1212 (using "structure"to mean an argumentthat comparesthe precise
languageof the Vesting Clausesand one that supportsa unitaryexecutive), with A. Michael
Froomkin, The Imperial Presidency's New Vestments, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 1346 (1994) (rejecting

Calabresiand Rhodes'sargumentas not "structural"
enough).
208. ProfessorBlackclearlysoughtto move beyonda clause-boundtextualism.See BLACK,
supra note 37. Yet, he also recognizedthat "the structureand relationsconcernedare themselves createdby the text."Id. at 31.
209. The notion of law as the commandof the sovereignis, of course,a stapleof muchjurisprudential thought of ancient and modern lineage. See J.M. KELLY,A SHORTHISTORYOF
WESTERNLEGAL THEORY289 (1992) ("We have seen virtually throughout the history of

Westernlegal thoughtthat, whenlaw is defined,it receivesa definitionin whichthe imperative
element, in other words the element of command, is central."). But cf H.L.A. HART, THE

OFLAW20-25(1994)(arguingthatthereare manyrulesin a systemwe call "law"that
CONCEPT
do not meet the strictAustinianmodel of law as a commandsupportedby sanction).
210. The debatesabout the unitaryexecutiveprovidean exampleof this obsession.See supra note 163and accompanyingtext.
211. See, e.g., Calabresi& Rhodes,supranote 31, passim (analyzingthe Vesting Clausesat
length).
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cient. The Constitutionnot only limits the exercise of political power
but also creates political power.212In a sense, we should know this.
The Founders knew it: Madison understood that political order depends upon channelingpublic opinion.213The modernsknow it: political philosophersof various stripes have argued that power is public
voice and relationship.214
Indeed, in an age of resurgentinterest in republicanism,21 it seems particularlyodd that lawyers would continue
to invest unreflectivelyin the notion that political power is only function or authority. Surely, to believe that power is decreed from
somewhere on high, transcendingpublic voice, is antitheticalto the
notion that "we the people" constituteour government.
The great danger here is not that the Supreme Court will make
the wrong decision.We have survivedtwo hundredyears of structural
controversy,some true crises, and more than a few difficult judicial
decisions. But it is tempting to wonder whether we would be better
off if the Court did not base its decisions on a view of the world in its
own image. Like most institutions,courts have a tendency toward institutional self-regard,and this affects the ways in which they think
about concepts.216
Function, as law, sees the world of political power
in the image of law, and it sustains the courts' idea of their own legitimacy by placing in their hands the rule of law. But this kind of
self-regard,however importantin some respects, also poses risks.For
212. As Richard Parker has tellingly written, almost all constitutional scholarship is antipopulist in the sense that it is hostile to the release of political energy. See RICHARD D.
POPULISTMANIFESTO65 (1994)
PARKER,"HERE THE PEOPLERULE": A CONSTITUTIONAL
("In the minds and hearts of most American constitutional lawyers, an Anti-Populist sensibility
appears to predominate now.").
213. See MICHAELSCHUDSON,THE GOOD CITIZEN:A HISTORYOFAMERICANCIVICLIFE
89 (1998) (arguing that Madison hoped and expected "that public opinion would find its voice in
and through the formal institutions of government" and noting his belief that "[plublic opinion
was as much something that government would make possible as it was the instrument to make
a government").
214. See ARENDT,supra note 10, at 44 ("When we say of somebody that he is 'in power' we
actually refer to his being empowered by a certain number of people to act in their name.");
HAMPTON,supra note 10, at 112-14.
215. See, e.g., Frank I. Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 1495 (1988) (contending that "republican constitutional thought is not indissolubly tied to ... static, parochial, or
coercive communitarianism"); Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court 1985 Term-Foreword:
Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4, 73 (1986) (arguing that a court's lawmaking
role must "sound in virtual representation"); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival,
97 YALE L.J. 1539 (1988) (discussing republican thought and describing the implications of republicanism).
216. For an extended argument, see Victoria Nourse, Making Constitutional Doctrine in a
Realist Age, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1401 (1997).
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in such a world, it is possible to sever the people from their Constitution, to believe, as the SupremeCourtso recentlysaid, that it is possible to have a governmentin which a man simply "happens"to be
President.217"[A] legal order cannot in the long run be true to itself
and at the same time be better than the values or vision of its benefiIn the end, a constitutiondisembodiedis no constitutionat
ciaries."218
all.

217. Clintonv. Jones,520 U.S. 681,701 (1997).
218. HURST,supranote 12, at 5.

